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INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDIATION: A GUIDING
PRINCIPLE FOR TRULY EDUCATED
DECISIONMAKINGt-
Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley*
I. INTRODUCTION: MEDIATION AND CONSENT RHETORIc
As a matter of general practice, mediation fails to provide for
truly educated decisionmaking, especially where the parties do not
have lawyers. This problem has become more acute with the dramatic
rise in mediation due to parties' increased desire to seek alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) and to court requirements that parties seek-
ing judicial resolution first seek mediation.' Not only are the num-
t Copyright © 1999 Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley.
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I See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPuTE REsOLUrrION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIA-
TION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 6-11 (2d ed. 1992), for an historical account of the alter-
native dispute resolution movement and the place of mediation in that movement.
Mediation's increased appeal is due to a variety of reasons including decreased costs,
high satisfaction, and compliance rates. See, e.g., Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh,
Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Lawyer's Philosophical Map?, 18 HAMLINEJ. Pun. L. &
POL'Y 376 (1997) (stating that attorneys value mediation because of the perception
that it encourages early settlement and therefore reduces costs of litigation). There
are, however, inconsistent reports of reduced costs. See, e.g., JAmES S. KAKALm ET AL.,
JusT, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
UNDER THE CIVItJusTIcE REFORM ACT 20 (1996) [hereinafter RAND REPORT] (stating
that mediation programs studied did not necessarily solve cost and delay problems).
There are consistent reports that parties experience high levels of satisfaction with the
mediation process. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie &James Levin, A "Party Satisfaction"Perspec-
tive on a Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RxsoL. 885 (1998) and
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bers of mediated matters large and growing, but the subject matters
are important and complex. Mediation is used to resolve the loss of a
roof over one's head2 or the termination of a life support system.3
The absence of truly educated decisionmaking means that mediation
may very well result in uninformed and potentially harmful results.
To remedy the problem, this Article recommends requirements to
help ensure that parties make knowledgeable choices about using the
mediation process and about accepting the terms of proposed resolu-
tions ("informed consent").
Advocates of mediation might find this recommendation odd.
They claim that mediation is the vindication of individual choice.
Much ADR rhetoric is predicated on assumptions about the value of
consent.4 The discourse of consent suggests that autonomy and its
legal equivalent, self-determination, 5 longstanding values in Anglo-
American jurisprudence, 6 are central values in mediation.7 My claim,
sources cited therein; Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a MediatorFor?"Medi-
ation's "Value-Added" for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1 (1996) (citing the
value of participation as the reason for high satisfaction rates).
2 See Wright v. Brockett, 571 N.Y.S.2d 660 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (finding that
tenant gave up the only housing she had known for twenty-seven years).
3 Some states permit mediation of actual life and death issues. In New York, for
example, decisions about whether to terminate life support may be made through the
mediation process. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2972 (McKinney 1993); NANCY
NEVELOPP DUBLER & LEONARD J. MARCUS, MEDIATING BIOETHIcAL DISPUTES: A PRAcTI-
CAL GUIDE 44-47 (1994) (describing mediation of dispute over patient's decision to
forego life-saving medical care); see also Diane E. Hoffmann, Mediating Life and Death
Decisions: A Critique, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 821 (1994); Diane E. Hoffman & Naomi Karp,
Mediating Bioethical Disputes, A.BA. Disp. REsOL. MAG., Spring 1996, at 10-12.
4 See, e.g., Administrative Dispute Resolution Act: Hearings on H.R. 2497 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 66 (1990) (statement of MarshallJ. Breger, Chairman, Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States, that the purpose of the Administrative Dis-
pute Resolution Act was based " [w] holly on the principle of consent" and that based
on consent parties could "shape procedures to meet their needs on a case by case
basis). The purpose of this Act was to encourage federal government agencies to use
alternatives to litigation in resolving disputes. Congress did not extend the Act and
the legislation expired in 1995. See also Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073
(1984); Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-
Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. Disp. RESOL. I (stating that "voluntari-
ness is consistent with the underlying philosophy of ADR"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some
Cases), 83 GEo. L.J. 2663, nn.129-38 (1995).
5 Respect for autonomy is the moral equivalent of the legal right of self-determi-
nation. See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF IN-
FORMED CONSENT 120 (1986).
6 SeeJOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 6 (1873). Mill wrote:
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however, is that the absence of informed consent in mediation under-
mines this commitment to autonomy.
Mediation shares a common goal of the court system: to achieve
justice and fairness in the resolution of disputes. Mediation, however,
is different from litigation because it is governed by the principle of
consent. Parties must agree to engage in the process and to its out-
come. In this respect, the values of mediation are quite different from
litigation. The value of consent promotes self-determination and au-
tonomy giving parties control. Disputing parties are said to be em-
powered jointly in owning their dispute, participating in the process
of its resolution, and controlling its outcome.8 Underlying the con-
sent and empowerment rhetoric is a central inquiry: what does in-
formed consent require in mediation? Unlike the concept of
informed consent in the physician-patient and attorney-client relation-
ships,9 the meaning of informed consent in mediation practice has
received little attention.
Mediation is a process of assisted negotiation in which a neutral
third party assists individuals in resolving a dispute.10 The idea of con-
sent is important in mediation and triggers a number of questions
about whether that consent is based on a true understanding of what
is occurring. Our legal system recognizes in a wide variety of contexts
that an individual's purported consent to a process, an agreement, or
[T] he sole end for which mankind are warranted... in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection .... The only part
of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which
concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his indepen-
dence is, of right absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign.
See also Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960) (stating that "Anglo-American
law starts with the premise of thorough-going self-determination"); Schloendorff v.
Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E.2d 92 (N.Y. 1914).
7 See STANDARDS OF CoNDucr FOR MEDIATORS, Preface to joint Committee of Del-
egates from the American Arbitration Association, American Bar Association Sections
of Dispute Resolution and Litigation, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Res-
olution (1994) [hereinafter JOINT STANDARDS OF CONDUCT]. Standard I provides:
"Self determination is the fundamental principle of mediation. It requires that the
mediation process rely on the ability of the parties to reach a voluntary, uncoerced
agreement. Any party may withdraw from mediation at any time." Id.
8 Id
9 There is voluminous literature on informed consent in medical decisionmak-
ing and modest but growing interest in informed consent in lawyering. See infra Part
Ii.
10 See JAY FOLBERG & AuSON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A ComPREHENsIVE GuiDE TO
RESOLVING CoNmicrs WrrHouT LITIGATION 7-8 (1986); CIS-RTOPHER W. MOORE, THE
MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CoNFucr 14 (1986).
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a waiver of rights is legally suspect unless that person has a certain
level of understanding and disclosure.'" I will call this notion the
"principle of informed consent." In mediation, the principle of in-
formed consent serves the same function that we imagine litigation
serves, even though we know it does not always do so-it helps to pro-
mote fairness.1 2 Informed consent prepares the way for a party to par-
ticipate voluntarily and intelligently in the mediation process and to
accept its outcome. It serves as a check on the mediator's power, a
way of making sure that the mediator has not used her position of
authority to cajole or bamboozle parties into consent. In short, in-
formed consent matters because the potential for coercion, incapac-
ity, and ignorance can impede the consensual underpinnings of the
mediation process.13
There are two separate but related components of informed con-
sent in mediation: disclosure and consent. At a minimum, the princi-
ple of informed consent requires that parties be educated about the
mediation process before they consent to participate in it, that their
continued participation in mediation be voluntary, and that they un-
derstand and consent to the outcomes reached in mediation. The
disclosures required by informed consent promote autonomous deci-
sionmaking. This in turn reduces the likelihood that parties will at-
tempt to rescind settlement agreements, thereby enhancing the
efficiency of mediation as a dispute resolution system.
The problem is that the state of informed consent in mediation
today is often more illusory than real.14 Parties, particularly those
without lawyers, often enter mediation without a real understanding
of the process and leave mediation without a real understanding of
11 See infra Part II and Part 1V.D.
12 Fairness is a predominant concern in the mediation community. Few com-
mentators would disagree that it is the normative standard governing mediation. De-
termining what constitutes fairness, however, is a difficult question. See infra note 57.
The notion of fairness in mediation has both substantive and procedural elements.
While most mediators agree on the necessity of fairness in the mediation process,
there is considerable debate about whether mediators should be responsible for the
fairness of mediation outcomes. I share the late Professor Maurice Rosenberg's con-
ception that equates fairness with justice: "an optimal dispute resolution system is one
that produces just results at the end ofjust proceedings." Maurice Rosenberg, Resolv-
ing Disputes Differently: Adieu to Adversary Justice?, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 801, 809
(1988).
13 These impediments can also affect the outcome of mediation. For a discussion
of informed consent as an ethical dilemma in mediation, see Robert A. Baruch Bush,
The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice: A Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Implications,
1994J. Disp. REsOL. 1, 15 (1994).
14 See infra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
[VOL- 74:3
INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDIATION
the result. Disclosure requirements are modest, focused primarily on
information related to the mediation process itself.15 There is little
regard for disclosures related to the outcome of mediation or to the
importance of understanding what has been disclosed, a concept that
has different meanings for represented and unrepresented parties.
This limited conception of disclosure diminishes the quality of con-
sent in mediation.
My goal is to promote critical, reflective examination of the prin-
ciple of informed consent in mediation and to give content to that
principle. 16 In my view, a theory of informed consent for mediation
should focus on the parties' acts of decisionmaking throughout the
mediation process. I argue, therefore, against a "thin" conception of
the principle of informed consent, one that is satisfied with signed
forms to indicate that disclosures have been provided and that individ-
ual consent is freely given. The principle of informed consent in me-
diation is not just about information flow and signatures. Parties,
particularly those who are unrepresented by lawyers, need to under-
stand what it means to participate voluntarily in mediation, how the
consent process operates, and what it means to reach an agreement.
They need to understand that a decision to settle through mediation
may result in a waiver of legal rights and remedies.
We must also pay more attention to the disparate circumstances,
locations, and human conditions under which mediation occurs. Par-
ties come to mediation in courts, public agencies, community dispute
centers, and private providers' offices with varying degrees of volunta-
riness and legal representation. 17 The range of mediation consumers
extends from sophisticated, repeat players to illiterate, unrepresented
parties. A sustained informed consent theory in mediation should dif-
ferentiate disclosure and consent requirements based on these dispa-
rate factors and human conditions.' 8 This requires an understanding,
15 See infra Part III.B.
16 This is a continuation of a larger project on the role of law and justice in medi-
ation. SeeJacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search forfustice Through
Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47 (1996) [hereinafter Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation]; Jacque-
line M. Nolan-Haley, Lauyers, Clients and Mediation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369
(1998) [hereinafter Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Clients and Mediation].
17 Some parties may not be represented by counsel at the actual mediation ses-
sion, but they may have been prepared or coached by attorneys prior to the session.
18 This approach has been endorsed in other aspects of mediation practice. The
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution recommends as a central principle
"that the greater degree of choice the parties have over the dispute resolution pro-
cess, program or neutral, the less mandatory should be the qualifications require-
ments." SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DisPTE RESOLUTION, REPORT OF THE SPIDR
COMMISSION ON QUALIFICATIONS (1989) [hereinafter SPIDR REPORT]. See also NA-
1999]
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not just of the substance of the principle of informed consent, but of
the practices that foster it in all the settings in which mediation
occurs.
I will propose a contextualized approach to informed consent
with a sliding-scale model of disclosures. The amount and kind of
information disclosed depends upon the location of the mediation,1 9
the voluntariness of the parties' consent,20 and the parties' representa-
tional status.21 I will argue that unrepresented parties need more dis-
closure than parties who have lawyers and that when courts require
unrepresented parties to mediate, fairness demands that they have a
basic knowledge of their legal rights. 22
Part II of this Article gives an overview of informed consent as an
ethical, moral, and legal principle in law and medicine. This provides
the framework for the discussion of informed consent in mediation.23
Part III begins that discussion by examining the values served by the
principle of informed consent in mediation: autonomy, human dig-
nity, and efficiency. Part IV provides a view of the current informed
consent landscape in mediation and argues that it is inadequate to
support mediation's commitment to autonomous decisionmaking. It
reviews the literature on informed consent, describes current disclo-
sure and consent requirements, examines the developing informed
consent jurisprudence, and, finally, suggests what is missing from our
prevailing understanding of informed consent. Part V addresses the
central inquiry of this Article, what the principle of informed consent
requires in mediation. It examines four decisionmaking models in
mediation and considers the requirements for disclosure and consent
TIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DisPUTE RESOLUTION, DIsPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM, 3 (May
1989); Robert P. Schuwerk, Reflections on Ethics and Mediations, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 757,
762 (1997) (arguing that standards governing mediators should differ in significant
ways from the rules governing lawyers). Contextualized rulemaking has also been
proposed for lawyers. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 799 (1992) (arguing for contextualized regulation of the legal profession).
19 Mediation takes place today in a wide variety of formal and informal settings.
See infra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
20 Parties who voluntarily agree to enter into the mediation process are in a very
different position from those who are required to attend a mediation session. See
infra notes 248-59 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 263-87 and accompanying text.
22 Unrepresented parties should always be aware of their legal rights when they
participate in mediation that involves legal issues. If they voluntarily choose to medi-
ate, however, they may waive knowledge of those rights. See infra notes 217-30 and
accompanying text.
23 I note here that transferring legal principles from one profession to another is
fraught with difficulties. See infra notes 52, 236.
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that should be operative in all models. Part VI offers implications for
mediation practice. It considers how informed decisionmaking can
be achieved in some of the disparate circumstances and conditions
under which mediation occurs, with particular focus on the most vul-
nerable mediation consumers, unrepresented parties in mandatory
court mediation programs.
II. WHAT IS INFORMED CONSENT?
Informed consent is an ethical, moral, and legal concept that is
deeply ingrained in American culture.24 In those transactions where
informed consent is required, the legal doctrine requires that individ-
uals who give consent be competent, informed about the particular
intervention, and consent voluntarily.2 5 Informed consent is the foun-
dational moral and ethical principle that promotes respect for individ-
ual self-determination and honors human dignity.
The principle of informed consent is the vehicle through which
autonomy is measured in decisionmaking between physicians and pa-
tients, and, to a lesser degree, between lawyers and clients.2 6 There
are two separate aspects of the principle: disclosure and consent. Pa-
tients sue physicians who are generally presumed to be the agents of
disclosure because they fail to inform fully before patients consent to
particular treatments. Informed consent legal analysis that has devel-
oped largely in medical cases tends to focus on the dual requirements
of disclosure and consent. In the context of disclosure, courts have
24 According to the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavior Research, the values underlying informed
consent
are deeply embedded in American culture and the American character; they
transcend partisan ideologies and the politics of the moment. Fundamen-
tally, informed consent is based on respect for the individual, and in particu-
lar, for each individual's capacity and right both to define his or her own
goals and to make choices designed to achieve those goals.
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedi-
cal and Behavioral Research, Informed Consent as Active, Shared Decisionmaking, in 1
MAKrN HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICrATIONS OF INFORMED
CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRAC=TONER RELATIONSHIP 16, 17 (1982) [hereinafter MAK-
ING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS].
25 See PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACICE 35-65 (1987).
26 Jay Katz distinguishes between what judges have done-the legal doctrine of
informed consent-and what they have aspired to-the idea of informed consent.
Katz claims that informed consent does not regularly govern the relationship between
physician and patient in practice. SeeJAY KATZ, THE SrIENT WORLD OF DoCrOR AND
PATIENT xvi, 227 (1984).
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grappled with problems of proof and legal definitions of the scope of
disclosure, 27 attempting to determine what risks the law requires phy-
sicians to disclose and whether the failure to disclose them caused
harm. The second requirement, consent, requires that individuals
voluntarily agree to treatment with some understanding of their
agreement.28
A. Informed Consent in the Physician-Patient Relationship
The literature on informed consent in medical decisionmaking is
voluminous. 29 The tort doctrine of informed consent requires that
physicians disclose "relevant medical information" to patients and
then obtain their consent before administering treatment.8 0 There
27 See APPELBAUM ET AL, supra note 25, at 56.
28 See id. at 57.
29 See, e.g., FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 30. There is currently a move to
reform several aspects of informed consent in medical decisionmaking. Scholars have
called for greater patient autonomy. See, e.g., Marjorie Shultz, From Informed Consent to
Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985). Others call for enhanced
understanding. See e.g., CathyJ. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Deci-
sionmaking: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 379 (1990)
(arguing not just for doctor's duty to disclose but patient's right to comprehend;
based on six months of research observing how doctors gave information to patients).
Some scholars cite the need for increased trust, see, e.g., Nancy E. Kass et al., Trust:
The Fragile Foundation of Contemporary Biomedical Research, 26 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25
(1996), while others call for more contextualized models. See Peter H. Schuck, Re-
thinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 (1994). A growing bioethics literature
argues in favor of less patient-centered ethics and more focus on process models and
family involvement. SeeJeffrey Blustein, The Family in Medical Decisionmaking, 23 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP. 6, 11 (1993) (arguing that patients should consider the interests of
family members in making decisions but the ultimate decision is theirs); John
Hardwig, What About the Family?, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (1990) (arguing for
abandonment of the patient-centered ethic in favor of a presumption of equality of
interests, both medical and nonmedical of each family member); James Lindemann
Nelson, Taking Families Seriously, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 6, 7 (1992) (stating that
there is a presumption that a competent patient is the ultimate decisionmaker but the
presumption can be rebutted by showing that family interests are sufficiently compel-
ling to override the patient's wishes). For a focus on shared decisionmaking, see DAN
W. BROCK, LIFE AND DEATH: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS IN BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 55 (1993);
Ezekiel J. Emmanuel & Linda L. Emmanuel, Four Models of the Physician-Patient Rela-
tionship, 267JAMA 2221 (1992); Mark G. Kuzcewski, Reconceiving the Family: The Process
of Consent in Medical Decision-Making, 26 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30 (1996).
30 For a discussion of the evolution of tort doctrine from a requirement of "sim-
ple" to "informed" consent, see APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 25, at 35-62; FADEN &
BEAuCHiAMP, supra note 5, at 125-43. The phrase "informed consent" was first articu-
lated in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (discussing physicians' duty to give "full disclosure of facts neces-
sary to an informed consent").
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are two theories of liability for violation of informed consent require-
ments. Traditionally, the failure to inform patients of the risks associ-
ated with treatment or surgery was considered by courts as a battery
on the theory that any subsequent touching was without consent.31
Modem law treats such breaches in negligence. 32
The specific type of information that physicians must disclose re-
lates to the nature of the particular condition and the purpose, risks,
and benefits of proposed treatment procedures.33 In some jurisdic-
tions, physicians may be required to disclose alternative methods of
treatment that are generally considered reasonable by the medical
community.34 The detailed nature of information that physicians are
required to disclose is considered the distinguishing characteristic of
the legal doctrine of informed consent.3 5 One of two different disclo-
sure standards may govern, depending upon the jurisdiction: (1) the
"professional practice standard," developed during the early years of
informed consent legal doctrine, focuses on the custom for disclosure
among physicians in general;3 6 and (2) the "patient-oriented" stan-
31 AsJustice Benjamin Cardozo observed almost a century ago: "[A] surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent, commits an assault, for which he
is liable in damages." Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E.2d 92, 130 (N.Y.
1914).
32 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 190
(5th ed. 1984). The distinction between the use of both theories of liability is articu-
lated by the court's opinion in Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, (Okla. 1979): "If treat-
ment is completely unauthorized and performed without any consent at all, there has
been a battery. However, if the physician obtains a patient's consent but has
breached his duty to inform, the patient has a cause of action sounding in negligence
.... " Id. at 559.
33 Physicians are required to disclose risks that are considered "material." PROS-
SER & KEETON Ex AL., supra note 32, at 191. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093,
1106 (Kan. 1960) (reversing verdicts for defendants in medical malpractice cases
where improper instructions were given to jury and stating that the physician is re-
quired "to make a reasonable disclosure.., of the nature and probable consequences
of the suggested ... treatment, and.., to make a reasonable disclosure of the dan-
gers within his knowledge which were incident to, or possible in, the treatment he
proposed to administer").
34 See; e.g, Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding that disclo-
sure of alternative treatment was required under Georgia law only where treatment is
generally accepted by reasonably prudent doctors); Gemme v. Goldberg, 626 A-2d
318 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (finding a failure to inform patient of viable alternatives to
treatment).
35 See APPELBAUM ET AL, supra note 25, at 57.
36 The relevant inquiry is directed towards what a reasonably prudent physician
would do. See, e.g., Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968) (overruling
the "locality" rule of Small v. Howard and holding that "a specialist should be held to
1999]
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dard focuses on what a reasonable person in the patient's situation
would find material in making decisions. 37
Although the issue of obtaining a patient's consent for treatment
has received less attention by the courts than disclosure, it is generally
held that a patient's consent to treatment or a decision not to consent
must be voluntary and with some degree of understanding.38 There is
little case law, however, on what is meant by "understanding."39
B. Informed Consent in the Lawyer-Client Relationship
What are the informed consent obligations of lawyers? The prin-
ciple of informed consent in the lawyer-client relationship is a similar
principle to that in medicine. Clients should be educated about their
choices and participate in decisionmaking. 40 The professional re-
sponsibility rules for the legal profession provide some conceptual
support for the principle of informed consent, but give little practical
guidance to lawyers. 41 Model Rule 1.4 mandates that lawyers "explain
a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
the standard of care and skill of the average member of the profession practicing the
specialty, taking into account the advances in the profession").
37 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding surgeon
liable for failure to reveal risk of paralysis involved in a laminectomy); Cobbs v. Grant,
502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972) (finding insufficient evidence to support theory of surgeon's
negligence or failure to obtain patient's consent); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676
(R.I. 1972) (finding sufficient evidence to support theory of radiologist's negligence
and holding that patient claiming lack of informed consent was not required to pro-
vide expert testimony regarding propriety of radiologist's silence as to hazards of radi-
ation treatment). Some courts have adopted a more subjective causation test that
focuses on what a particular patient would have deemed material. See PROSSER &
KEETON ET AL., supra note 32, at 191, 192. Faden and Beauchamp observe, however,
that the subjective standard has been created by legal scholarship rather than by the
courts. See FADEN & BEAucHAMP, supra note 5, at 33-34, 46 n.34.
38 See, e.g., Canterbuy, 464 F.2d at 779-80 ("True consent to what happens to
one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to
evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each ....
From these . . . considerations springs the . . . requirement, of a reasonable divul-
gence by physician to patient to make such a decision possible.").
39 See The Law of Informed Consent, in 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra
note 24, at 193, 198.
40 See DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS As COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED AP-
PROACH (1990).
41 In this regard, Professor Robert Cochran has observed that while "lawyer codes
hold up client control as an aspiration .... [t] hose portions of the code that en-
courage client control do not require it." Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation
and the Next Steps Toward Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure To Allow the
Client To Control Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
819, 825 (1990).
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make informed decisions regarding the representation." 42 While the
informational requirements for lawyers contained in Model Rule 1.4
may not be as extensive as those imposed upon physicians under tort
law,43 they demonstrate a clear mandate for disclosure.44 On the
other hand, regulation of client "consent" rights is more ambiguous.
Model Rule 1.2(a), that governs the allocation of decisionmaking
power in the attorney-client relationship, establishes, in effect, an
"ends/means" approach, in which the client decides the "ends" of a
given problem and the attorney decides the "means."45 The inherent
complexity of determining what constitutes real ends and means has
made it difficult to integrate this distinction in legal practice, leaving
the principle of informed consent dangling on the outer fringes of
the lawyer-client relationship. 46
The foundational analysis of an informed consent principle in
the lawyer-client relationship is rooted in the lawyer's professional ob-
ligation to inform clients of relevant information and in the client's
autonomy interest in participatory decisionmaking.47 The idea of an
42 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrIY Rule 1.4 (1997).
43 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
44 See GEOFFREY C. HAzARD,JR. ET AL., THIE LAw AND ETHICS OF LAwYERING 488 (2d
ed. 1994).
45 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrn Rule 1.2(a) (1997) ("[A] lawyer
shall abide by a client's decision concerning the objectives of representation... and
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer
shall abide by the client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a mat-
ter....")
46 David Luban has eloquently captured the inherent difficulty of the ends/
means concept in his observation that it
assumes a sharp dichotomy between ends and means, according to which a
certain result (acquittal, a favorable settlement, etc.) is all that the client
desires, while the legal tactics and arguments are merely routes to that re-
sult. No doubt this is true in many cases, but it need not be: the client may
want to win acquittal by asserting a certain right, because it vindicates him in
a way that matters to him; or he may wish to obtain a settlement without
using a certain tactic, because he disapproves of the tactic. In that case, what
the lawyer takes to be mere means are really part of the client's ends.
David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454, 459 n.9.
47 See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERs, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAwv AND
ETHICS 69 (4th ed. 1995);JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & RICHARD W. PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL
AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 49 (1997); DEBORAH L. RHODE &
DAVID LuBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 604, 605 (2d ed. 1995); DEBORAH RHODE, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBn .ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 411 (1994); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1986); RICHARD A. ZrFRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL
ETHICS IN THE PRACtiCE OF LAw 211 (1995). The nature of informed consent in the
lawyer-client relationship is a topic that demands comprehensive treatment and is
beyond the scope of this article.
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informed consent principle to govern the attorney-client relationship
is of recent origin 48 and, compared to the significant interest that the
topic of informed consent has generated in the medical literature,
surprisingly little legal literature exists.49
The first significant article urging adoption of an informed con-
sent standard for the legal profession appeared in 1979 with Professor
Mark Speigel's proposal for expanded client decisionmaking and his
claim that "shared decisionmaking is the solution to dilemmas that
have long plagued the profession. '50 The notion that lawyers should
provide information necessary for clients to become involved in deci-
sionmaking has met with mixed reaction. Some scholars urge accept-
ance of the principle,5 1 while others argue that, based on the difficulty
of interpreting this standard in medicine, informed consent is not a
48 See DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974);
Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307
(1980); Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1049 (1984); Gary A. Munneke & Theresa
Loscalzo, The Lawyers's Duty to Keep Clients Informed: Establishing a Standard of Care in
Professional Liability Actions, 9 PACE L. REV. 391 (1989); Cornelius J. Peck, A New Tort
Liability for Lack of Informed Consent in Legal Matters, 44 LA. L. REV. 1289 (1984); Mark
Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979) [hereinafter Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking];
Mark Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking
and the Role of Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
1003 [hereinafter Spiegel, The New Model Rules]; Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model
of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1987).
More recently, the literature has focused on effective client decisionmaking rather
than on mechanical concepts of informed consent. A recent law school casebook
summarizes the issue as follows:
The central question is not, however, whether the lawyer can make a recom-
mendation to clients. The central question is whether the lawyer has pro-
vided the information necessary for the client to be an effective decision
maker .... Our experience ... leads us to believe that with appropriate
information from the lawyer-information about assessment, options, and
predictions-most clients can be effective decisionmakers.
ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL., LAWYERING: PRAcric AND PLANNING 86, 87 (1996). I have
argued elsewhere for a deliberative client counseling model in representational medi-
ation practice to help achieve the goal of informed consent in mediation. See Nolan-
Haley, Lawyers, Clients and Mediation, supra note 16.
49 As a number of commentators have observed, the legal profession's lack of
interest is all the more remarkable given its involvement in developing an informed
consent model for the medical profession. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 48, at 316, 317;
Speigel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking supra note 48, at 42 (stating that
"[I]awyers created the doctrine of informed consent for the medical profession").
50 Spiegel, Lawyer and Client Decisionmaking supra note 48, at 140.
51 See supra note 48.
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desirable standard to govern the attorney-client relationship.52 Over
the past twenty years, specific informed consent discussions have been
subsumed in broader conversations about the nature and limits of cli-
ent decisionmaking,53 the merits of client autonomy,54 and justifica-
tions for lawyers exercising substantial control over their clients.55
More recently, informed consent discussions have occurred in con-
nection with the debate over whether lawyers have a duty to inform
clients of their alternatives to litigation in resolving disputes.56
III. VALUES INFORMED CONSENT SERVES IN MEDIATION
In mediation practice, the principle of informed consent is not
an end in itself but is a means of achieving the fundamental goal of
fairness.57 Fairness requires that parties know what they are doing
52 See, e.g., BINDER ET AL., supra note 40, at 278 n.46 (citing FADEN & BEAIuCHAMIP,
supra note 5) (noting the debate in the medical profession about the quantity and
kind of information that must be disclosed and the meaning of understanding).
Binder accepts, however, the philosophy of an informed consent standard to the ex-
tent that it "would push lawyers towards making clients real partners in the decision-
making process." Id.
53 See, e.g., Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refine-
ment, 32 ARIZ. L. REv. 501 (1990); AlexJ. Hurder, Negotiating the Layer-Client Relation-
ship: A Search for Equality and Collaboration, 44 BuFF. L. REv. 71 (1996). In practice,
decisionmaking questions are highly contextual. See Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client
Decisonmaking in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice: An Empirical Study of Lawyers' Norms, 9
GEo.J. LEGAL ETmIcs 1101 (1996).
54 See, e.g., Cochran, supra note 41 (favoring greater client autonomy); Camille A.
Gear, The Ideology of Dominations: Barriers to Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics Scholarship,
107 YALE L.J. 2473 (1998); see also Donald F. Harris, Prisoners of Prestige? Paternalism
and the Legal Profession, 17J. LEGAL PROF. 125 (1992) (stating that the Model Code and
Model Rules do not adequately protect clients' autonomy).
55 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and
Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD.
L. REv. 563 (1982) (stating that paternalism is justified when actor's choice did not
truly express his identity, for example, because of fear and depression); Luban, supra
note 46 (stating that paternalistic coercion is justified when the client's goal fails to
meet minimal tests of reasonableness); William H. Simon, Layer Advice and Client
Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case 50 MD. L. REv. 213 (1991) (discussing "crude" versus "re-
fined" views of autonomy); see also Mark Spiegel, The Case of Mrs. Jones Revisited: Pater-
nalism and Autonomy in Lauyer-Client Counseling, 1997 BYU L. REv. 307 (1997) (arguing
against Professor Simon's suggestion that there is no meaningful difference between
autonomy and paternalism).
56 See Cochran, supra note 41; Lynn Nelson, Legal Informed Consent: Is It a Concept
Whose Time Has Come?, 1991 A.-B.A SEC. Disp. REsOL. MAG. 1, 2; Frank E. A. Sander &
Michael Prigoff, At Issue: Professional Responsibility: Should There Be a Duty To Advise
Clients of ADR Options?, 74 A.BA. J. 5050, 5050-51 (1990).
57 There is little dispute that fairness is the fundamental goal of any dispute reso-
lution process including mediation. See, e.g., AMERICAN ARBrrRATION ASSOCIATION,
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when they decide to participate in mediation, that they understand all
aspects of the decisionmaking process, including their right to with-
draw consent and discontinue negotiations, and that they understand
the outcome reached in mediation. Toward this end, the principle of
informed consent in mediation protects the psychological and legal
interests associated with the values of autonomy, human dignity, and
efficiency.
A. Autonomy in Mediation Enhanced Through Informed Consent
1. Autonomy in General
Commentators have written about autonomy generally in the
moral, political, and social spheres.58 Central to the principle of au-
tonomy is the notion of self-governance or self-determination. 59 From
the classic liberal conception of individualism to feminist and commu-
nitarian understandings, autonomy is a term which evokes a wide
spectrum of different views. 60 Given its rich literature and history,
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL 13-14 (May 1998) [hereinafter AAA CONSUMER
PROTOCAL] (arguing that fairness is the fundamental goal of ADR processes); MELINDA
OSTERMEYER & SUSAN L. KEILIzT, CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETrLEMENT AND INSTITUTE OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, MONITORING AND EVALUATING
COURT-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES AND COURT MAN-
AGERS 32 (1997) ("Above all else, ADR should be fair."); DANIEL McGiLLis, COMMU-
Nry MEDIATION PROCRAMS: DEVELOPEMENTS AND CHALLENGES, 55 (1997) ("[I] t seems
quite clear that if any process claims to render a high quality ofjustice, the disputants
whose cases are handled by the process should view the process as fair."); MOORE,
supra note 10, at 303 ("The goal of negotiation and mediation is a settlement that is
seen as fair and equitable by all parties."). How to achieve the goal of fairness, how-
ever, has and no doubt will continue to be the subject of much debate. Compare
Judith L. Maute, Mediator Accountability: Responding to Fairness Concerns, 1990 J. DisP.
RESOL. 347 withJoseph B. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST.J. DisP. RESOL.
909 (1998). See also Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Domi-
nant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317 (1995);
infta notes 88, 101 and accompanying text; Cecilia Albin, The Role of Fairness in Negoti-
ation, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 223 (1993) (identifying four aspects of fairness in
negotiation).
58 See, e.g., GERALD DWORIUN, THE THEORY AND PRACrICE OF AUTONOMY 3-10
(1988).
59 The word "autonomy" comes from the Greek words "autos," meaning self, and
"nomos," meaning rule or law. Id. at 12.
60 See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 123 (4th ed. 1994) (discussing the elements of autonomous action); Gerald
Dworkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent, in 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra
note 24, at 63; DWORKIN, supra note 58; James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Auton-
omy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1, 30 n.165 (1995); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy:
Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 26 (1989) (stating that au-
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there is much from which mediation scholars and practitioners may
draw in understanding the relationship between the principle of in-
formed consent and autonomous decisionmaking.
2. Mediation Autonomy
Respect for autonomy and its legal equivalent, the right of self-
determination, 61 is widely accepted as the intrinsic value of mediation,
and the principle of informed consent provides the structural frame-
work through which this value is measured in mediation.62 The value
of autonomy in mediation lies in what Gerald Dworkin has described
as its "intrinsic desirability of exercising the capacity for self-determi-
nation."63 This capacity for self-determination is described in the
Code of Professional Conduct for Mediators as the "fundamental prin-
ciple" of mediation. 64 Mediation theorists and practitioners repeat
the theme, emphasizing the self-governance and empowerment as-
pects of mediation.65
tonomy includes feeling). Moral philosopher Joseph Kupper explains autonomy in
terms of deliberation and action. SeeJOSEPH H. KuPFER, AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL INTER-
ACTION 10-14 (1990).
61 See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 120 ("[T]he right of self-determina-
tion is the legal equivalent of the moral principle of respect for autonomy").
62 Autonomy, however, is not the exclusive interest honored in mediation. A re-
port of the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution describes several conflicting
values and goals in dispute resolution including: (1) increased disputant participation
and control of the process and outcome, (2) restoration of relationships, (3) in-
creased efficiency of the judicial system and lowered costs, (4) preservation of social
order and stability, (5) maximization ofjoint gains, (6) fair process, (7) fair and stable
outcomes, and (8) social justice. See SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION, Ensuring Competence and Quality in Dispute Resolution Practice, REPORT 2 OF THE
SPIDR COMMISSION ON QUALIFICATIONS 5 (1995).
63 Dworkin wrote that
[T] here is value connected with being self-determining that is not a matter
either of bringing about good results or the pleasures of the process itself.
This is the intrinsic desirability of exercising the capacity for self-determina-
tion. We desire to be recognized by others as the kind of creature capable of
determining our own destiny. Our own sense of self-respect is tied to the
respect of others-and this is not just a matter of psychology. Second, no-
tions of creativity, of risk-taking, of adherence to principle, of responsibility,
are all linked conceptually to the possibility of autonomous action.
DWOIoIN, supra note 58, at 112.
64 STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, supra note 7, Standard I.
65 See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH &JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIA-
TION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPowERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994);
FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 10;JoHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE:
CoNFucr TRANSFORMATION ACROSS CULTURES 61 (1995) (empowerment); James Al-
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The idealized vision of autonomy in mediation, "mediation au-
tonomy," is grounded in relational and communal values. 66 As a gov-
erning principle, it is concerned not just with one's self but with the
other party to the dispute. Mediation autonomy is exercised in coop-
eration with the other party. In this regard, Lon Fuller's classic defini-
tion characterizes mediation's "capacity to re-orient the parties toward
one another, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to
achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a percep-
tion that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward each
other."67 Central to his definition is an understanding of "mediation
autonomy" as a relational concept. Thus, unlike the way that auton-
omy is expressed and understood in traditional liberal theory68 with
its emphasis on privacy and self, mediation autonomy is connected to
other human beings; it requires cooperation and collaboration with
other persons whose values may differ.69
Mediation autonomy has two components which are linked to the
principle of informed consent. First, conceptually, the principle of
autonomy distinguishes mediation from the adjudicatory dispute reso-
lution processes. Instead of allocating decisionmaking power to a
third party, the parties who are affected by a dispute retain such
power.70 Second, mediation autonomy operates as a corrective to pa-
ternalism. As a limiting principle, it gives the mediator power to con-
fini & Gerald S. Clay, Should Lawyer-Mediators be Prohibited from Providing Legal Advice or
Evaluations?, 1994 A.B.A. SEC. Drsp. RESOL. 8.
66 In practice, however, relational and communal values may not control. De-
pending upon the kind of mediation and whether lawyers are involved, the exercise
of autonomy in mediation can be an adversarial or nonexistent experience. See, e.g.,
James Alfini, Trashing Bashing and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "Good Mediation"?,
19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991); Stacy Bums, The Name of the Game Is Movement: Conces-
sion Seeking in Judicial Mediation of Large Money Damage Cases, 15 MED. Q. 359, 362-63
(1998) (describing mediation of large money damage cases by acting and former
judges in a public courts).
67 Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325
(1971).
68 See Nedelsky, supra note 60.
69 Thus, mediation autonomy operates individually and communally and in this
regard it shares feminist and communitarian concerns with the interdependence of
all members of the moral and political community. SeeAMITAi ETZIONI, THE SPIRIr o
COMMUNrrY: THE REINVENTION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 261 (1993) (stating that media-
tion and arbitration are better than adversarial litigation); Nedelsky, supra note 60, at
8.
70 The ability to make such choices distinguishes mediation from adjudication.
[VOL- 74:3
INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDIATION1999)
trol only the process in which parties' decisionmaking occurs, while
the parties retain the power to decide and control the outcome.71
B. Human Dignity Protected Through Informed Consent
The principle of informed consent promotes respect for the fun-
damental value of human dignity in several aspects of mediation deci-
sionmaking.72 First, the value of dignity is most frequently associated
with the right to participate in decisionmaking. When disputing par-
ties can participate directly in the bargaining process, their percep-
tions of procedural fairness are enhanced. Second, the principle of
informed consent guards against unwanted intrusions into highly per-
sonal aspects of parties' lives. There is the potential for a high degree
of personal exposure in mediation that makes parties' privacy inter-
ests vulnerable. 73 As described in one informed consent form: "Medi-
ation may involve the risk of remembering and disclosing unpleasant
events. Your disclosures may lead you to feel vulnerable, and the ne-
gotiations you enter into can arouse emotions, such as fear and anger,
or feelings of anxiety, uncertainty, or frustration."74 When parties can
71 Alison Taylor makes this point so well: "The clients are in charge of the man-
date, scope and outcome of mediation, and the mediator is in charge of the process."
Alison Taylor, Concepts of Neutrality in Family Mediation: Contexts, Ethics, Influence, and
Transformative Process, 14 MEDIATION Q. 215 (1997). Of course, in some forms of eval-
uative mediation, the parties may give the mediator substantial control over the out-
come. See infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text (discussing evaluative and
facilitative approaches to mediation); see also Bernard Mayer, The Dynamics of Power in
Mediation and Negotiation, 16 MEDIATION Q. 75 (1998) (arguing that the mediator's
power over the process derives from the parties' consent).
72 For a discussion of the meaning of human dignity values, see Joseph Goldstein,
For Harold Lasswell: Some Rejlections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and
the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 686 (1975).
73 Of course, savvy parties represented by mediation advocates might insist that
mediators meet privately with parties in a caucus in order to guard against such vul-
nerability. For a further discussion of the caucus, see infra notes 146-50 and accom-
panying text. It is not just emotional interests, however, that may be at risk. One
author has observed that in the business setting, parties are not comfortable with full
disclosure of internal business information. "Full disclosure is inconsistent with main-
taining a competitive advantage over one's rival. In negotiation, information is a
form of power: the greater the information disparity the greater advantage .... Most
trial attorneys will not encourage their clients to participate in mediation if full disclo-
sure is required." SamuelJ. Imperati, Mediator Practice Models: The Intersection of Ethics
and Stylistic Practices in Mediation, 33 WiLLuvErrE L. RExv. 703, 713 (1997).
74 Bob Helm, Mediators'Duties, Informed Consent, and the Hafields Versus the McCays,
21 MEDIATION Q. 65, 73 (1988) (claiming that mediators fall to disclose fully about
the limits of confidentiality).
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decide for themselves whether they can tolerate this kind of exposure
or personal invasion, the value of human dignity is enhanced.
Third, the principle of informed consent promotes understand-
ing and alleviates the fears associated with lack of information. When
parties come to mediation without sufficient knowledge of what is oc-
curring, there is a greater likelihood that they will consciously or un-
consciously resist mediation and thus never fully give consent to
participate. 75
Finally, recognition of individual human dignity contributes to a
mediation process that is free of fraudulent and coercive influences. 76
The principle of informed consent requires that mediators be honest
with both parties and disclose whatever information is necessary to
prevent deliberate fraud, manipulation, and trickery.77 This aspect of
the human dignity value of informed consent operates throughout
the mediation process. 78
C. Efficiency Promoted by Informed Consent
The principle of informed consent promotes educated decision-
making and thus contributes to efficient dispute resolution. 79 It
makes agreements more stable and durable.80 The idea of consent
promotes satisfaction with the mediation process,8 ' results in greater
compliance8 2 with mediated settlement agreements, and realizes
75 See Maria R. Volpe & Charles Bahn, Resistance to Mediation: Understanding and
Handling It, 13 NEGOTIATIONJ. 297 (1987) (arguing that fear of the unknown and lack
of information creates resistance to mediation).
76 Substantial power imbalances should be included in this category.
77 Before parties make a final decision to enter into the mediation process,
mediators should inform them that they will make such disclosures. See infra notes
240-44 and accompanying text (discussing baseline levels of disclosure for
mediators).
78 It differs, therefore, from the first three aspects of the human dignity value that
pertain to the decision to enter into the mediation process.
79 See Strauss, supra note 48, at 336-39.
80 SeeJames H. Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions
and Tentative Proposals, from an Evaluative Lawyer-Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 795
(1997) ("IS]ettlements that are achieved by means of withholding information from
litigants face the risk of collateral attack if the parties later find out there was addi-
tional information they should have had when they settled their case.").
81 See Guthrie & Levin, supra note 1; NANcY ROGERS & CRAIc A. MCEWEN, MEDIA-
TION: LAW, PoLicY, AND PRACTIcE § 4:04 (2d ed. 1994).
82 Cf Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court:
Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & Soc. REV. 11, 47 (1984) ("Consent
enlists a sense of personal obligation and honor in support of compliance, and con-
sensual processes are more open than command to the establishment of reciprocal
obligations and of detailed plans for carrying out the terms of an agreement.").
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greater overall efficiency.83 The factual disclosures encouraged by the
practice of informed consent enhance the settlement process.84 This
allows for decisionmaking that is the product of reasoned judgment
based on a sound factual foundation. Informed consent leaves parties
with the feeling that the outcome was fair, and thus, there is less likeli-
hood that parties will attempt to rescind or repudiate their
agreements. 85
I. THE INADEQUACY OF INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDIATION:
CURRENT LANDSCAPE
Interest in a principle of informed consent for mediation has
evolved over the last two decades from an almost exclusive focus on
divorce mediation to more broad-based conversations about the suffi-
ciency of disclosures to which parties are entitled, the role of nonlawy-
ers as well as lawyer-mediators, and the role of law in the mediation
process.86 The most explicit discussion of informed consent has
emerged as a subtext in the ongoing debate about the merits of
83 Particularly in court-connected mediation, this can save the courts substantial
time in responding to challenges to agreements. See infra notes 151-74 and accompa-
nying text.
84 Lawyers, particularly in business disputes, are unwilling to settle without a suffi-
cient factual basis. Professor Nancy Rogers quotes a nonsettling attorney: " 'I have
never settled a case in mediation. This is so because these [business] cases involve a
great deal of discovery and once discovery is complete people just want to go to trial.
People are unwilling to resolve cases without all the facts and thus extensive discov-
ery.'" Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law To Increase the Use of
Mediation and To Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
831, 842 (1998). The Rand Report shows mediation is less successful where discovery
is not sufficient. See RAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 45-46; see also Imperati, supra note
73, at 713.
85 See, e.g., Alvarez v. Reiser, 958 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). The facts in
Alvarez are troubling. After the parties mediated a divorce case, the wife discovered
that her husband had misrepresented the value of his retirement and 401K accounts
in the inventory he filed before mediation. She moved to "re-mediate" the funds
issue but the presiding judge denied her motion and called the case to trial. At trial
the wife stated that she did not consent to or was not in agreement with the mediated
settlement. She testified that she believed the agreement was unfair because it did
not include additional community funds. She also stated that she entered into the
settlement agreement only after twelve and one-half hours of "complete duress."
Even though the trial court acknowledged that the mediation at some point became
"Chinese torture," and that "the agreement may not be fair to anyone," it entered a
consent judgment. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Alvarez v. Reiser, 958 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.
App. Ct. 1997) (No. 11-96-206-CV) (petition for review denied June 5, 1998).
86 See, e.g., Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt, Remodeling the Model Standards of
Conduct for Mediators, 2 HARv. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 87 (1997);Joel Kurtzberg &Jamie
Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law: Designing an Interest and Rights Focused Model of
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mediators offering professional information or advice to parties. 8 7
Overall, informed consent discussions have been characterized by a
concern with achieving fairness in the mediation process.88
A. Developing Informed Consent in Mediation: Literature Review
Ethical concerns regarding informed consent first occurred in
the late 1970s and early 1980s when lawyers began to practice divorce
mediation. 89 Most questions were framed as professional responsibil-
ity inquiries about the role of the lawyer who acted as a mediator.
How could lawyers possibly be neutral?90 How could they comediate
with nonlawyers without violating the unauthorized practice of law
statutes?9 ' What rules would govern their conduct?92
Several bar association ethics opinions responded to queries
about the necessary disclosure requirements that attorney-mediators
Landlord/Tenant Mediation, 1997J. DisP. RESOL. 53; ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 81,
§§ 6, 10, 11.
87 This is popularly known as the "evaluative versus facilitative" debate. SeeJohn
Feerick et al., Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1995 J.
Disp. REsOL. 95, 106-08.
88 Professors Nancy Rogers and Craig McEwen include informed consent as an
aspect of the continuing fairness debate in mediation. See ROGERS & McEwEN, supra
note 81, § 2:02; Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant
Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317 (1995);
Stulberg, supra note 57.
89 See, e.g., Richard E. Crouch, Divorce Mediation and LegalEthics, 16 FAM. L.Q. 219,
237-38 (1982) ("Principally, the problem seems to be that of obtaining consent that is
sufficiently informed. For an informed consent, the attorney has to have made full
disclosure of the important facts and considerations, and the person waiving the right
of independent representation has to understand all of these.").
90 See, e.g., Andrew S. Morrison, Is Divorce Mediation the Practice of Law? A Matter of
Perspective, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1093 (1987); Sandra E. Purnell, The Attorney As Mediator-
Inherent Conflict of Interest?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 986 (1985); Wendy Woods, Model Rule 2.2
and Divorce Mediation: Ethics Guidelines or Ethics Gap?, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 233 (1987).
Many of these questions arose in response to a model of divorce mediation proposed
by 0. J. Coogler, that involved the use of an impartial advisory attorney. See 0. J.
COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETT.EMENTs 85-92 (1978).
91 See ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 81, § 10.
92 For a discussion of the the early bar association ethics opinions, see Leonard L.
Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARiz. L. REV. 329
(1984); Linda Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems in Divorce Mediation, 7 FAM.
L. REP. 4001 (1981). For an analysis of more recent bar association ethics opinions,
see Alison Smiley, Professional Codes and Neutral Lawyering: An Emerging Standard Gov-
erning Nonrepresentational Attorney Mediation, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 213 (1993).
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should provide before parties could participate in mediation.93 The
predominant concern was that disputing parties would confuse the
lawyer's role as mediator with that of an advocate and that this con-
ceptual confusion would invalidate their consent to participate in me-
diation. One of the most significant ethics opinions, issued by the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, explicitly cautioned
lawyer-mediators about the necessity for obtaining the parties' in-
formed consent before agreeing to mediate divorce cases.9 4 The
opinion recognized, however, that some situations would be too com-
plex for a party's consent to be "considered fully informed."95
Commentators offered more refined proposals to govern law-
yers' participation as neutrals in mediation,96 and in 1984, the Ameri-
can Bar Association adopted Standards of Practice for Lawyer
93 See, e.g., Boston Bar Ass'n Comm'n of Professional Responsibility, Op. 78-1
(1978); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm'n of Professional &Judicial
Ethics, Op. 80-23 (1980); Connecticut Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 35 (1982).
94 SeeAss'n of the Bar of the City of NewYork Comm'n of Professional &Judicial
Ethics, Op. 80-23 (1980). The opinion listed the following seven guidelines that
should be followed before lawyers could participate in divorce mediation and noted
that "underlying these guidelines is the requirement that the lawyers' participation in
the mediation process be conditioned on informed consent by the parties." Id. at II.
First, the lawyer must clearly and fully advise the parties of the limitations on his
or her role, and specifically, of the fact that the lawyer represents neither party and
that accordingly, they should not look to the lawyer to protect their individual inter-
ests or to keep confidences of one party from the other. Second, the lawyer must fully
and clearly explain the risks of proceeding without separate legal counsel and thereaf-
ter proceed only with the consent of the parties and only if the lawyer is satisfied that
the parties understand the risks and understand the significance of the fact that the
lawyer represents neither party. Third, a lawyer may participate with mental health
professionals in those aspects of mediation which do not require the exercise of pro-
fessional legaljudgment and involve the same kind of mediation activities permissible
to lay mediators. Fourth, lawyers may provide impartial legal advice and assist in re-
ducing the parties' agreement to writing only where the lawyer fully explains all perti-
nent considerations and alternatives and the consequences to each party of choosing
the resolution agreed upon. Fifth, the lawyer may give legal advice only to both par-
ties in the presence of the other. Sixth, the lawyer must advise the parties of the
advantages of seeking independent legal counsel before executing any agreement
drafted by the lawyer. Seventh, the lawyer may not represent either of the parties in
any subsequent legal proceedings relating to the divorce.
95 Id.
96 See, e.g., Grouch, supra note 89. Crouch proposed a preliminary written con-
tract in which "[a]ll the warnings, waivers, and informed consents contemplated by
this unique form of divorce negotiation should be embodied in the contract...." Id.
at 248.
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Mediators in Family Disputes. 97 These standards clarified the differ-
ence between the lawyer's role as partisan advocate and that of neutral
mediator and established three "informed consent" duties for lawyers
who mediated family disputes: (1) define and describe the process
and its cost,98 (2) assure that mediation participants make decisions
based upon sufficient information and knowledge, 99 and (3) advise
parties to obtain legal review prior to reaching an agreement. 100
Later informed consent commentary focused more explicitly on
the problem of achieving fairness in mediation. Scholars argued for
informed consent based on fairness or justice principles and offered a
variety of new rules and models to govern neutral lawyering.1° 1 More
recently, informed consent discussions have taken place within the
larger debate over the relative merits of facilitative and evaluative ap-
proaches to mediation. 10 2 Should mediators limit their activities to
facilitating and managing the process of mediation or should they be
allowed to influence the outcome by offering evaluations to the par-
ties?10 3 While there is no real consensus on what constitutes mediator
97 These standards were adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association in August 1984 [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE]. The stan-
dards are reprinted in GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 469.
98 See id. at Standard I.
99 See id. at Standard IV.
100 See id. at Standard VI.
101 Professor Judith Maute, concerned with mediator accountability, proposed a
rule detailing the neutral lawyers' obligations: "By undertaking to mediate a dispute
capable of legal resolution when the parties are not independently represented, the
lawyer mediator assumes a responsibility to tell the parties enough about the applica-
ble law and its uncertainties so their settlement decision is adequately informed."
Maute, supra note 57, at 366. See alsoJudith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice:
A Case for Mediator Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1991) (proposing that
the ABA adopt Model Rule 2.4 to govern the conduct of lawyers who serve as
mediators). Professor Leonard Riskin developed a model for neutral lawyering in
mediation, arguing that lawyers should aim for an agreement that does not violate
minimum standards of fairness. Lawyers would be permitted to give legal information
in this model. See Riskin, supra note 92.
102 I must say that I agree with those commentators who recognize that the debate
should not be framed in this way at all but that the question should be more related
to when facilitation and evaluation are appropriate. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Be-
yond Formalism and False Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the
Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 949 (1997).
103 There is extensive literature on this question. See, e.g., Marjorie Corman
Aaron, ADR Toolbox: The Highwire Art of Evaluation, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH
COST OF LITIGATION 62 (1996);JamesJ. Alfini, Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation: A
Discussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 919 (1997); John Bickerman, Evaluative Mediator
Responds, in 14 ALTERNATwES TO THE HIGH CosT OF Lnm. 70 (1996);James B. Boskey,
Let 100 Flowers Bloom, ALTERNATIVE NEWSL., Nov. 1996, at 1; Cris M. Currie, Wanted: A
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evaluation, it is frequently equated with giving some form of legal in-
formation to parties. 0 4 Reduced to simple form, the claim of the pro-
evaluation argument is that relevant (legal) information by the media-
tor can enhance informed consent and self-determination, values that
should take precedence over competing values of neutrality and im-
partiality. 10 5 Beyond disclosure of "legal" information, commentators
Theoretical Construct for Mediation Practice, 53 Disp. RESOL. J. 70 (1998); Dwight Golann
& Marjorie Corman Aaron, Managing the Merits: The Use (and Misuse) ofEvaluation in
Mediation,. Disp. RESOL J. (1997); Imperati, supra note 73; Kimberlee K. Kovach &
Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation Is an Oxymoron, in 14 ALTERNATVES TO THE HIGH
COST OF LITIG. 31 (1996) [hereinafter Kovach & Love, Evaluative Mediation];
Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3
HAv. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 71 (1998) [hereinafter Kovach & Love, Mapping Media-
tion] (arguing against evaluation); John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Prac-
tices Transform Each Other., 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 839, 856-79 (1997); Lela P. Love, The
Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 937 (1997);
Jonathan Marks, Evaluative Mediation-Oxymoron or Essential Tool?, AM. LAw., May
1996, at 48A Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical for Mediators to Evalu-
ate orAdvise?, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 669 (1997); Barbara A. Phillips, Mediation: Did We Get
It Wrong?, 33 Wn Err L. REv. 649, 701 (1997); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation Quan-
daries, 24 FLA ST. U. L. REV. 1007 (1997); Stark, supra note 80; Stempel, supra note
102; David U. Strawn, Does a Mediator Have an Affirmative Duty To Assure That Consent
To Settle Is Truly Informed?, 3 JusT. RESOL. 1 (1998); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative
Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
985 (1997); Ellen A. Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate in Mediation: Applying
the Lens of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 155 (1998); Ellen A. Waldman,
The Role of Legal Norms in Divorce Mediation: An Argument for Inclusion, 1 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 87 (1993) [hereinafter Waldman, Legal Norms]; DONALD T. Weckstein, In
Praise of Party Empowerment-and of Mediator Activism, 33 WnILAMIArE L. REV. 501
(1997).
104 For a helpful understanding of evaluation as a continuum of directive behav-
iors, see Margaret Shaw, Evaluation Continuum, Prepared for CPR Ethics Commission,
May 6-7, 1996. Inquiries submitted to Florida's Mediator Qualifications Panel exem-
plify the ethical dilemmas inherent in evaluative mediation. See, e.g., MQAP Op. 95-
005C (on file with author) (Is a mediator who becomes aware that a plaintiff in a
wrongful death action is making no claim for loss of consortium, which claim would
appear to the mediator to be appropriate under the circumstances, bound to inform
that party of this matter? In this case, the ethics panel held that it was an ethical
violation for the mediator to give legal advice to a party.); MQAP Op. 95-002D (While
it is known that a mediator should not advise, can a question be asked even if the
framing of the question tends to advise or inform one or both of the parties involved?
The panel responded: It is improper for a mediator to provide legal advice by any
method within the scope of a mediation, whether such advice by statement, question
or any other form of communication.). For a thoughtful discussion of the lines
mediators draw between proper and improper evaluation, see Stark, supra note 80, at
784-92.
105 In an earlier article, I adopted this position. See Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation,
supra note 16; see also Stempel, supra note 102 (endorsing a flexible mediation model
1999]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
following an informed consent approach have also called for greater
disclosure of social norms, 10 6 community values, 10 7 and the individual
mediator's choice of model.10 8
Those who reject evaluative approaches view orthodox mediation
as a more facilitative process that could be weakened by evaluation.10 9
that permits judicious use of evaluation); Moberly, supra note 103; Stark, supra note
80 (stating that the principal purpose of evaluation in mediation is to promote the
parties' self-determination through informed consent);James H. Stark, Preliminary Re-
flections on the Establishment of a Mediation Clinic, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 457, 487 (1996).
Stark wrote:
When settling their disputes, disputants must be permitted to invoke legal
norms if they choose to, and the mediator must take steps to ensure that the
parties' choices are knowing and informed. In my view, any threat to the
appearance of neutrality and impartiality is a necessary price that mediators
must pay for party empowerment and informed consent.
Id. See also Waldman, Legal Norms, supra note 103. Gerard Clay argues that parties
need evaluation in order to make informed decisions about their rights and interests.
See Alfini & Clay, supra note 65. Other commentators observe that evaluation hap-
pens, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO
THE HIGH COST OF LrrIG. 57, 61 (1996), or think about it as a contractual issue, see
Marjorie Corman Aaron, Evaluation in Mediation, in DWIGr GoLANN, MEDIATING
LEGAL DispuTEs: EFFEarIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS 267-305 (1996)
(discussing conditions that are appropriate for evaluation in mediation).
106 See Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple
Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 707 (1997) ("Heightened attention to the role
of social norms in mediation is necessary to allow mediators to adequately explain
their methodologies and to allow clients to supply informed consent to mediator
interventions.").
107 See Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex "Marriage" Through Alternate Dispute Res-
olution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1687 (1997).
108 E.g., Imperati, supra note 73, at 711 (offering nineteen decision points that
mediators should consider discussing with parties prior to mediation); Lande, supra
note 103; Michael Moffitt, Casting Light on the Black Box of Mediation: Should Mediators
Make Their Conduct More Transparent?, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1 (1997) (argu-
ing that a mediator should share information with the parties about the actions she is
taking and the impact she intends to achieve).
109 Robert Benjamin, What is Mediation Anyway? Ethical Issues, Policy Issues and the
Future of the Profession, NIDR NEws, July/Aug. 1996, at 9; Currie, supra note 103, at 74
(arguing that evaluation techniques should "not be included on the list of ethical
mediation techniques"); Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 103; Kovach
& Love, Evaluative Mediation, supra note 103; Stark, supra note 80, at 775 n. 11 (quot-
ing symposium comments of Dean John Feerick) ("[S] elf-determination is the most
basic principle of mediation. Facilitation follows from that .... Evaluation weakens
the facilitative process."); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empower-
ment and Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L.
REV. 253, 260-61 (1989) (characterizing the protection of rights conception of media-
tion as concerned with ensuring informed consent); Stulberg, supra note 57 (arguing
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These commentators do not disagree that parties should have relevant
information. Their claim, however, is that mediators should not pro-
vide this information. Some supporters of the facilitative model, how-
ever, would allow mediator evaluation if the parties request it and
provide their "informed consent."" 0
Less attention has been focused on the meaning of consent in
mediation. In his 1992 study of ethical dilemmas in mediation, Pro-
fessor Robert Baruch Bush argued that "meaningful consent" re-
quired "an opportunity for free and informed choice by both parties
regarding any options for settlement.""' He identified three classic
situations that affect the validity of consent: coercion, incapacity, and
ignorance."12 Other commentators have raised questions about the
meaning of consent," 3 the nature of voluntariness, 114 and the factors
affecting the quality of consent in mediation." 5
B. Regulatory Landscape of Informed Consent in Mediation
The proliferation of mediation programs over the last two de-
cades has resulted in an extensive collection of statutes, court rules,
and ethics standards to govern mediation practice." 6 The idea of in-
formed consent is rarely articulated as an explicit value in these regu-
that a uniform mediation statute should not contain an evaluative model). The Stan-
dards of Conduct for Mediators endorse a facilitative model. SeeJoINT STANDARDS OF
CoNDUCT, supra note 7, Standard I.
110 Love, supra note 103, at 941.
111 Bush, supra note 13, at 13.
112 Seeid.
113 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 2692 nn.129-38.
114 E.g., James Boskey, The Proper Role of the Mediator: Rational Assessment, Not Pres-
sure, 10 NEGOTIATIONJ. 367 (1994).
115 ProfessorJohn Lande's examination of the factors affecting the quality of con-
sent thoughtfully considers some of the internal and external influences on the con-
sent process. See Lande, supra note 103. Professor Lande proposes seven indicators
to judge the quality of consent:
(1) explicit identification of the principles, goals, and interests, (2) explicit
identification of plausible options for satisfying these interests, (3) the prin-
cipals' explicit choice of options for consideration, (4) careful consideration
of [these] options, (5) mediators' restraint in pressuring principals to accept
particular [substantive] options, (6) limitation on use of time pressure,
[and] (7) confirmation of [principals'] consent [to selected options.]
Id. at 869-78. See also Carla E. Munroe, Court-Based Mediation in Family Law Disputes:
An Effectiveness Rating and Recommendations for Change, 13 PROB. LJ. 107 (1996) (argu-
ing that "knowing consent" be defined in law because it is an essential element of
procedural due process).
116 See generally ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 81, ch. 12. Throughout the balance
of this article, I will refer to ethics codes, standards, and court rules as "regulations."
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lations," 7 but it is expressed instead through disclosure requirements
for mediators and, to a lesser extent, in consent regulations for the
parties. Systematic analysis of informed consent requirements is diffi-
cult. A substantial amount of regulation takes place at the local level,
and in some cases, within the same state mediation practice can be
governed by multiple regulations.
1. Disclosure Requirements
Disclosure requirements for mediators are a prevailing feature in
most mediation statutes and ethical standards. 118 Regulations vary in
the amount and type of information that parties should receive: some
states have elaborate disclosure provisions while others take a "bare
bones" approach. At a minimum, most regulations require that
mediators provide procedural information about mediation.1 1 9 Be-
117 For some notable exceptions, see Appendix A. With respect to private stan-
dards, see THE OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS OF MEDIATION PRACTIcnE
(1993) (Responsibilities to the Parties, Section 2, requires the "informed consent" of
the parties "prior to the beginning of substantive negotiations ... ."). These stan-
dards are discussed more fully in Imperati, supra note 73. In some states, informed
consent is explicitly linked to self-determination. See, e.g., GA. ALTERNATIVE Disp. R.
App. CT. ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS (1995); ALA. CODE OF ETHICS FOR
MEDIATORS STANDARD 4 (1996). See generally Deborah A. Ledgerwood, Family Media-
tion in St. Louis County: Steeled Against the Critics?, 52J. Mo. B. 351, 353 (1996) (finding
that mediators have a duty to "assure informed consent").
118 E.g., GA. ALTERNATIVE DISP. RESOL. R., App. C, ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR
MEDIATORS, Standard I (1995) (requiring an explanation of nine items of information
in disclosure); FLA. R. CERTIFIED & CT. APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.020 (d) (5) (detailed
disclosure); The CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, INSTITUTE OFJUDICIAL ADMINISTRA-
TION, NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION, Rule 3.2(b) (1992)
[hereinafter NATIONAL STANDARDS] list ten items of process information which courts
should provide to parties and their attorneys: Information on process: (1) the nature and
purpose of mediation; (2) confidentiality of process and records; (3) role of the par-
ties and/or attorneys in mediation; (4) role of the mediator, including lack of author-
ity to impose a solution; (5) voluntary acceptance of any resolution or agreement; (6)
the advantages and disadvantages of participating in determining solutions; (7) en-
forcement of agreements; (8) availability of formal adjudication if a formal resolution
or agreement is not achieved and implemented; (9) the way in which the legal and
mediation processes interact, including permissible communications between
mediators and the court; (10) the advantages and disadvantages of a lack of formal
record. Id.
119 E.g., Mo. R. Cv. P. 88.06(a) (3) (West 1997) (stating that mediators should
define and describe the process of mediation); N.C. R. OF S. CT. FOR THE DIsP. RESOL.
COMM'N, STANDARDS OF PROF. CONDUCT, Standard IV(A) (West 1997); STANDARDS FOR
PRIVATE AND PUB. MEDIATORS IN THE STATE OF HAW. (adopted by the Hawaii Supreme
Court on April 22, 1986; standards are aspirational) ("Before beginning mediation
and throughout the process, mediators shall educate parties about the mediation pro-
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yond basic process information, disclosure requirements may include
information about how mediation differs from other forms of conflict
resolution,120 any mediator conflicts of interest,' 2 ' relevant laws, 122
costs, 128 and settlement options.124 A few states have specific addi-
tional disclosure provisions for unrepresented parties. 125
cess, distinguish mediation from other procedures, explain the respective responsibil-
ities of the mediator and the parties, affirm the party's willingness to participate in
such a process, and fully explain any applicable policies, procedures, and
guidelines.").
120 See, e.g., IDAHO R. Crv. P. 16(j) (19), MEDIATION OF CHILD CUSTODY AND VIsrrA-
TION Disp., R. 7(a) (I) (West 1997) (mediator must describe the difference between
mediation and other forms of conflict resolution including therapy and counseling);
N.C. R. of Ct. 6(B) (b) (West 1997) (implementing mediated settlement conferences
in superior court civil actions); S.C. K. OF CT., ALTERNATrvE Disp. RESOL., Cm. CT.
MEDIATION 7(b) (3) (West 1997).
121 See, e.g., ALA. CODE OF ETHICS FOR MEDIATORS, Standard V(B) (West 1997);
FLA. STAT. ANN. MEDIATOR CONDUCT P. 10.070(b) (West 1997); IND. ALTERNATIVE
Disp. RESOL R. 7.3(6); N.J. Civ. R. 301.1 (g) (2) (B) (West 1997).
122 E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 654A.1 (West 1995) (farmer-lender mediation); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 1141-105(a), (b) (Michie 1997) (farmer-lender mediation). However,
some ethical standards explicitly prohibit mediators from giving legal advice. See
Moore, supra note 10, at 303 ("At no time shall a mediator offer legal advice to parties
in dispute.") (citing CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrIY FOR MEDIATORS). Others
do not permit legal advice unless a party's attorney is present. See ALA. CODE OF ETH-
ICS FOR MEDIATORS, Standard 7(d) (1996) ("A mediator may discuss possible outcomes
of a case, but a mediator may not offer a personal or professional opinion regarding
the likelihood of any specific outcome except in the presence of the attorney for the
party to whom the opinion is given.").
123 See IDAHO R. Crv. P. 16 0) (7) (a) ("The mediator has a duty to define and de-
scribe for the parties the process of mediation and its cost during the initial confer-
ence before the mediation conference begins.... ."); Mo. CT. R, S. CT. R. OF Crv. P.
88.06(a) (1) (relating to legal separation and child support); N.C. R. FOR DiSP. RESOL.
COMM'N., STANDARDS OF PROF. CoNDucr, Standard IV.A(6); N.C. SUPER. CT. R. 6B(c);
S.C. R. OF GT., ALTERNATIVE Disp. REsOL., Cm. CT. MEDIATION, R. 7(b) (9). See also
STANDARDS OF CoNDuCT, supra note 7, Standard VII.
124 E.g., MAss. S. Cr. UNIF. R. ON DiSF. RESOL. 6(I) (LEXIS 1998); NATIONAL STAN-
DARDS, supra note 118, Rule 11.2.
125 E.g., ALA. CODE OF ETHICS FOR MEDIATORS, Standard 3(a) (5) (1996). Standard
3(a) (5) provides:
[1]n the event a party is not represented by an attorney, the mediator should
explain: (I) That the parties are free to consult legal counsel at any time and
are encouraged to have any settlement agreement resulting from the media-
tion process reviewed by counsel before they sign it; and, (2) That a medi-
ated agreement, once signed, is binding and can have a significant effect
upon the rights of the parties and upon the status of the case.
Iowa mediation rules require that mediators give the following warning to unrep-
resented parties:
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2. Consent Requirements
There is much less emphasis in the regulations on consent than
on disclosure. Many states require parties to sign agreements indicat-
ing their consent to enter into the mediation process.' 26 The content
of consent forms varies. On some forms the parties indicate that the
required disclosures were made by the mediator before they began to
mediate, 127 or that they have been advised of their rights and obliga-
tions. 128 Other consent forms specifically state that parties know that
WARNING
Without review and advice by your own independent legal counsel, you
may be giving up legal rights to which you are entitled, or running certain
risks of which you are not aware, with respect to the following types of issues:
(1) Real and personal property division.
(2) Income tax consequences resulting from an agreement regarding divi-
sion of property, alimony, or child support.
(3) Accurate documenting and recording of conveyances and proper title to
real estate or personal property.
(4) Alimony.
(5) Child custody, visitation and support.
(6) Court costs and attorney fees.
(7) Subsequent modifications and substantial changes in circumstances.
(8) Court disapproval of any submitted agreement which is contrary to the
parties', or an affected child's legal rights.
The above is not a complete list of legal rights and is not meant to be.
There may be other considerations unique to the circumstances of your indi-
vidual case. You should consult a lawyer for advice.
Id. See also Iowa R. GOVERNING STANDARDS OF PRAC. FOR LAW. MEDIATORS IN FAM. Disp.
6 (effective February 1987); DEL. CT. R. Clv. PRO. 16.2(I) (1996); NATIONAL STAN-
DARDS, supra note 118, Rule 1.4 (urging courts to provide that "pro se litigants make
informed choices about mediation").
126 E.g., Michigan, letter from Douglas A. Van Epps, J.D., Director of Community
Dispute Resolution Program (Apr. 4, 1998) (form on file with author); Nebraska,
letter from Kathleen Severns, Director, Office of Dispute Resolution (Apr. 1998)
(form on file with author); Oklahoma, letter from Sue Darst Tate, ADR System Dir.,
(Apr. 29, 1998) (consent form on file with the author); Nevada, e-mail from Phil
Bushard, D.P.A. Mediator, Family Mediation Program, SecondJudicial District Court,
Nevada (parties read and sign groundrules for mediation) (copy on file with author).
For a sample of an agreement to mediate in community context, see Thomas Stipa-
nowich, The Quiet Revolution Comes to Kentucky: A Case Study in Community Mediation, 81
Ky. L.J. 855 (1993).
127 In Georgia, parties sign a waiver statement. Telephone Interview with Ansley
Boyd Barton, Director of the Georgia Office of Dispute Resolution (April 1998).
128 See, e.g., DEL. R. OF CT., SUPER. CT. R. OF Cry. P., Interim Rule 16.2, VOLUNTARY
MEDIATION (d) (1996). Regarding written consent to mediation, the rule state:
Prior to the commencement of the mediation conference, the disputing par-
ties shall enter into a written consent which specifies the methods by which
the parties shall attempt to resolve the issues in dispute. The written consent
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the mediator has no duty to inform them of their legal rights,12 9 or
that they understand the confidentiality of the process.'8 0 When an
agreement is reached in mediation, some states require that the par-
ties and their attorneys sign a writing.' 3 1
Consent provisions are also covered indirectly through general
prohibitions against mediator coercion.' 32 Finally, mandatory media-
tion programs generally ignore any requirements for consent and
specify some form of good faith participation. 33
3. Remedies for Violation of Disclosure and Consent
Requirements
What are the consequences of violating the norms surrounding
informed consent? The issue of remedies is complicated by at least
form shall include the following: (1) The fights and obligations of parties to
the mediation; and (2) The confidentiality of the conference. The written
consent shall be signed by the parties, their counsel, and the mediator.
Id.
129 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.35(1) (West 1988) ("A mediated settlement
agreement is not binding unless it contains a provision stating that it is binding and a
provision stating substantially that the parties were advised in writing that (a) the
mediator has no duty to protect their interests or provide them with information
about their legal rights . .. ").
130 E.g., Kansas, KAN. Sup. CT. R. OF MEDIATION 901(b)(1); New Jersey, Mercer
County Custody Mediation Program (form on file with author); New Mexico, letter
from Victoria B. Garcia, Esq., Director, Court Alternatives (June 16, 1998) (form on
file with author). See PhilipJ. Ritter, ADR: What About Confidentiality , 51 TEx. BJ. 26,
27 (1980) ("Most [ADR] centers ... require that each party sign an agreement or
waiver. These agreements usually provide that disputants will protect the confidenti-
ality of the [ADR] process .... ).
131 E.g., FLA. R. Crw. P. 1.730(b).
132 E.g., IND. R. ALT. Disp. RESOL. 7.5(a); TENN. Sup. CT. R. 31, App. A(5) (b); Miss.
R. OF CT., PILOT MEDIATION PROGRAM IN CH., CiR., AND CouNTY CTS., § 9(b) (West
1997); UTAH R. OF CT.-ANNEXED ALTERNATIVE DIsP. RESOL. 104, CODE OF ETHICS FOR
ADR PROVIDERS, Canon VIII(a) (Process and Terms of Settlement in Mediation)
(West 1998). See also MOORE, supra note 10, at 300 ("At no time should a mediator
coerce the parties into an agreement.") (citing CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR
MEDIATORS).
133 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 §§ 214, 518 (West 1997); ME. CODE PROF.
RFsP. 3.4 (H) (1); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5430(c) (4) (1980); WASH. REv. CODE § 59.20-
080(2). See generally ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 81, § 7:04; Richard D. English,
Annotation, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Sanctions for Failure to Participate in Good Faith
in, or Comply with Agreement Made in Mediation, 43 A.L.R. 5th 545 (1996). The National
Standards for Court-Connected Mediation Programs caution that courts may require
parties to participate in mediation only when "they provide clear and complete infor-
mation about the precise process and procedures being required." This includes in-
formation that "they are not required to make offers and concessions or to settle."
NATIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 118, R. 11.2.
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two factors. First, many states provide for mediator immunity unless
there has been willful mediator misconduct.1 34 Second, there is no
generally recognized tort for mediator malpractice. 135 Thus, the legal
remedies for violation of disclosure and consent requirements are lim-
ited in most states to procedural mechanisms such as removal from
approved lists of mediators13 6 or decertification. 13 7 While criminal
penalties may result from unlawful disclosure of confidential media-
tion information, 138 few penalties exist for the mediator's failure to
give required disclosures. 139
C. Practices and Policies for Disclosure and Consent
1. Disclosure and Consent
In general, disclosure and consent practices in mediation are un-
derstudied. Disclosure of basic process information, including confi-
dentiality rules, is typically carried out by the mediator in her opening
statement. This is supplemented in some states with premediation dis-
closure through brochures that may be sent to parties in advance, or
134 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-306 (1991). See generally ROGERS & McEwEN,
supra note 81, at § 11:03.
135 See ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 81, at § 11:03.
136 See, e.g, Ledgerwood, supra note 117, at 353 (reporting that in the St. Louis
County Program, noncompliance with the requirements, including duty to assure in-
formed consent, "may result in removal from the court approved list of mediators.").
The National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation Programs recommend con-
tinued monitoring with possible removal from mediation roster. See NATIONAL STAN-
DARDS, supra note 118, Rule 6.6.
137 See, e.g., VA. COMPLAINT PROC. FOR MEDIATORS CERTIFIED TO RECEIVE CT.-RE-
FERRED CASES (March 1997) (copy on file with the author). See generally ROGERS &
McEWEN, supra note 81, at § 11:04.
138 See ALA. CODE § 24-8-12(a) (1992) (disclosure of information from concilia-
tion hearings in housing disputes is a misdemeanor); 42 U.S.C § 2000g-2 (1994) (stat-
ing that in mediation conducted under the auspices of the U.S. Community Services
Mediation, unlawful disclosure of mediation information results in criminal liability).
139 The Minnesota Civil Mediation Act permits the imposition of criminal liability
on a mediator for failing to provide parties with a written statement of "educational
background and relevant training and experience in the field." MINN. STAT. § 572. 37
(1996). A Virginia statute permits a mediated agreement to be vacated where specific
disclosures were not made. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.12 (Michie 1993) (permit-
ting courts to vacate mediated agreement where neutral failed to inform parties in
writing at the commencement of the mediation process that: "(i) the neutral does not
provide legal advice, (ii) any mediated agreement will affect the legal rights of the
parties, (iii) each party to the mediation has the opportunity to consult with in-
dependent legal counsel at any time and is encouraged to do so, and (iv) each party
to the mediation should have any draft agreement reviewed by independent counsel
prior to signing the agreement or should waive his opportunity to do so").
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made available in mediation centers and court programs140 or
through videos describing the mediation process. 141 We know very
little about what is permitted to count as informed consent and
whether parties understand disclosures that have been made. Studies
are conflicting. Some show thatjudges use subtle coercion to provide
the air of consent without actually obtaining it from unrepresented
parties.' 42 Others show greater party understanding and satisfaction
with the mediation process. 143
2. Mediator's Influence on the Consent Process by Information
Control
In mediated negotiations, the mediator has considerable control
over the flow of information generated during bargaining, and this
may have subtle effects on the consent process. Whenever a mediator
assists parties by identifying and refraining the issues in a dispute, she
may influence the result of the mediation and the authenticity of the
parties' self-determination. 44 Each interjection by a mediator during
140 Telephone Interview with Arlene Richardson, Assistant Director of ADR pro-
grams in Alabama (June 2, 1998); Virginia has a brochure, Mediation: A Consumer
Guide, that is distributed to parties (copy on file with the author).
141 The procedures used in Utah represent a good example of premediation dis-
closure through the use of an ADR video. Utah has a voluntary court-annexed alter-
native dispute resolution program. Civil cases in specified districts courts are
automatically referred to the ADR program. When a complaint is filed, the court
clerk notifies the parties of the referral and they may then choose from the available
options, one of which is mediation. The court brochure states that parties are asked
to "make an informed choice." To assist in this decisionmaking process, parties and
their counsel are required to watch a short video entitled, ADR: A Different Choice.
The film explains mediation and nonbinding arbitration. Parties who choose not to
pursue ADR after watching the video sign a statement that they have reviewed the
videotape and discussed ADR with their counsel and have decided to defer use of
ADR (copy of brochure on file with author).
142 See Munroe, supra note 115.
143 See Charlene E. Depner et al., Client Evaluations of Mediation Services: The Impact
of Case Characteristics and Mediation Service Models, 32 FAm. & CONC1LIATION CTs. REV.
306, 310 (1994) (reporting that parties in mandatory court-connected custody media-
tion program believed that procedures were described clearly).
144 Scholars refer to this process as "selective facilitation." David Greatbatch &
Robert Dingwvall, Selective Facilitation: Some Preliminary Observations on a Strategy Used by
Divorce Mediators, 23 LAw & Soc. REv. 613 (1989). Professor James Stark notes that
this is similar to the problem of "pigeonholing" in legal interviewing:
The mediator leads the discussion in certain directions but not others, facili-
tates the examination of particular subjects but not others-a consequence
of poor listening or deficient imagination or some bias, perhaps uncon-
scious, on the mediator's part... In such cases, the mediator's selective
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the mediation process affects how the parties interact with each other
and the direction of their negotiations. 145
The mediator's control over the information flow increases when
she meets privately with parties in a caucus.1 46 The mediator decides
what information to solicit in caucus and then how much of that infor-
mation to reveal to the opposing party. In this filtering process, she
may select only the information that, in her judgment, will lead to
settlement. 147 Alternatively, a mediator may learn of a settlement of-
fer in caucus, but not transmit it too early in the process for fear that it
will not be accepted by the other party.148 Information filtering con-
tinues throughout the mediation process 1 49 and gives the mediator
significant information control both in the general session and in the
caucus. This may subtly affect the parties' exercise of self-determina-
tion and their ultimate consent to any agreement reached in
mediation.
50
D. Challenges in Court to Mediation Settlement Agreements
A thin but growing jurisprudence of "mediation" informed con-
sent lurks in the interstices of contract law as unsatisfied litigants at-
tempt to set aside their mediated settlement agreements, alleging
facilitation creates a risk not just of inefficient service, but of biased, weak
and deficient agreements.
Stark, supra note 105, at 481.
145 See Angela Garcia, The Problematics of Representation in Community Mediation Hear-
ings: Implications for Mediation Practice, 22J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 23, 26 (1995). Garcia
describes an empirical study of three ways in which mediators represent what parties
say: first, mediators may represent a disputant by rephrasing or repeating; second,
they make statements consistent with the disputants' position but go beyond rephras-
ing; and third, mediators "may create their own arguments;" thus, mediators have a
"subtle influence over the outcome of the process." See also Christopher Honeyman,
Patterns of Bias in Mediation, 1985 Mo. J. Disp. RESOL. 141.
146 A caucus is a private meeting with one of the parties and the mediator. See
JOSEPH B. STULBERG, TAKING CHARGE/MANAGING CoNFIar 107-12 (1987). For a dis-
cussion of how the caucus presents several opportunities for mediators to engage in
deceptive behavior, see John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use and Abuse, 29 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 1 (1997).
147 This is true even though many standards caution mediators against simply
pushing for settlement. See, e.g., NATIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 118, Rule 11.
148 If mediators conduct the mediation session in joint session, there is less oppor-
tunity for mediators to manipulate information.
149 See Stark, supra note 105, at 481 ("Mediators sometimes withhold or manipu-
late information because it works in achieving settlement.").
150 SeeJennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80
VA. L. REV. 323, 325-26 (1994) (stating that a critical source of power for mediators is
to respond to parties' disparate information); see also Moffitt, supra note 108.
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various failures of disclosure and impediments to consent.1 1 Courts
typically treat the issue of enforceability under general principles of
contract law and "mediation-inspired"' 52 agreements are treated like
other settlement agreements. 53 The defenses available in contract-
fraud, duress, undue influence, and unconscionability-are equally
available in mediation. 5 4 However, in those states that have enacted
151 Some states specifically provide for the enforcement of agreements reached in
mediation. See, e.g, GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-32 (1997); HAw. REv. STAT. § 378-5(I)
(1997); IND. CODE § 22-9-1-6(p) (1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 344.610 (Michie 1997).
The extent to which courts should intervene in informed consent cases raises impor-
tant questions for future examination. First, should court intervention be based on
the substance of the mediation with a higher standard of scrutiny applied where im-
portant rights are involved? Some states, for example, require court review of divorce
mediation agreements. E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752 (West Supp. 1997);
Mo. R. Cirv. P. 88.06; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-305 (WEST 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-09.1-07 (1991); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 107.765 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.09.015 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(12) (West 1993).
Second, should there be a higher standard for review of mediated agreements than
for regular settlement contracts?
152 See Cary v. Cary, 894 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (court refused to
uphold judgment resulting from court-ordered mediation where one party withdrew
consent).
153 See Sheng v. Starkey Labs., Inc., 117 F.3d 1081, 1083-84 (8th Cir. 1997) (up-
holding settlement agreement where parties arrived at settlement unaware thatjudge
handed down summary judgment motion); Davis v. Wickham, 917 S.W.2d 414, 416
(Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (finding mediated child custody agreement enforceable and
remanded for trial after one party withdrew consent); Martin v. Black, 909 S.W.2d
192, 194 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing judgment enforcing mediated settlement
where fact issue existed on one party's intent to be bound and that party requested a
jury trial on that fact issue); In re Marriage of Ames, 860 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1993) (court upheld mediated divorce settlement despite one party's withdrawal
of consent but remanded for inconsistencies with trial court judgment); Snyder-
Falkinham v. Stockburger, 457 S.E.2d 36 (Va. 1995) (enforcing settlement of legal
malpractice claim where plaintiff objectively manifested intent to settle).
154 A related group of "consent" cases challenges consent on technical or proce-
dural insufficiencies. See Gordon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 641 So.2d 515 (Fla.
Dist. Ct App. 1994) (holding that settlement agreement reached during mediation
was not binding in the absence of one party's signature); Jordan v. Adventist Health
System/Sunbelt, 656 So.2d 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (enforcing agreement
signed by parties but not by lawyers as required by Florida Rules of Civil Procedure),
rev. denied, 663 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1995); Singer v. Singer, 652 So.2d 454 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (enforcing mediated agreement that had been incorporated into the final
judgment despite provisions in the agreement for the later preparation of a more
formal document), appeal after remand, 706 So.2d 914 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
Graves v. Graves, 649 So.2d 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that orally an-
nounced mediation agreement that was not reduced to writing and filed with the
court was not enforceable); Stempel v. Stempel, 633 So.2d 26 (Fla. Dist. CL App.
1994) (upholding "bare bones" mediation agreement, supplying missing terms), cause
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statutes treating mediation settlement agreements differently from or-
dinary settlement agreements, 15 5 courts follow a modified contract law
approach. 156
Cases alleging consent deficiencies in mediated agreements in-
clude claims of intimidation, 157 coercion,' 58 withholding of informa-
tion, 159 misrepresentation, 160 and undue influence by either the
mediator, opposing parties, opposing counsel, or the parties' own at-
torneys. 161 Allegations of insufficient disclosures by attorneys,162
mediators, 163 and opposing parties 64 are claimed as the basis of lack
of real consent. Courts have been particularly sensitive to the claims
of unrepresented parties.165
dismissed, 639 So.2d 982 (Fla. 1994); Burckhard v. Del Monte Corp., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d
569 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing decision enforcing settlement agreement signed
by attorneys rather than the parties themselves).
155 See ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 81, at § 4:13 nn.26-41.
156 See, e.g., Haghighi v. Russian-American Broad. Co., 945 F. Supp. 1233 (D.
Minn. 1996) (enforcing mediation settlement agreement that failed to state it was
binding despite MINN. STAT. § 572.35), certified question answered by 577 N.W.2d 927
(Minn. 1998).
157 See Murphy v. Padilla, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to
enforce oral agreement made by attorneys in mediation).
158 See, e.g., McEnany v. West Delaware County Community Sch. Dist., 844 F. Supp.
523 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (enforcing mediated settlement where plaintiff consented for
attorney to enter into settlement on her behalf).
159 See Alvarez v. Reiser, 958 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (enforcing mediated
settlement agreement where wife tried to withdraw consent because she was unaware
of her husband's increase in retirement and 401K plans).
160 See Hur v. City of Mesquite, 893 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (involving an
agreement based on false information and misrepresentation of authority).
161 See, e.g., McKinlay v. McKinlay, 648 So.2d 806 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1995) (hold-
ing that wife who asked court not to enforce mediated settlement agreement based
on duress or intimidation could not assert privilege for matters concerning mediation
communications to prevent mediator from testifying).
162 See In re Marriage of Banks, 887 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (enforcing
mediated settlement agreement although wife sought to repudiate divorce mediation
agreement claiming inter ali. (1) her attorney did not advise her regarding reim-
bursement law; (2) she felt she had no right to refuse to sign the settlement agree-
ment; (3) she was induced to sign the agreement by duress or fraud).
163 See Wright v. Brockett, 571 N.Y.S.2d 660 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (involving claim
by unrepresented tenant that mediator did not inform her of her legal rights).
164 See, e.g., Alvarez, 958 S.W.2d at 232.
165 See Wright, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 662, 664. This case arose under a New York statute
which treats mediation agreements as an arbitration award. The Wrights filed suit to
have the court order Brockett out of her apartment in their building. They sought
enforcement of a mediated agreement, whereby Brockett agreed to vacate the apart-
ment. She subsequently refused to do so, arguing inter alia that (1) she agreed to
vacate only because the "situation at the apartment was so unpleasant;" (2) she was
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A second category of failed consent cases are principal/agent sit-
uations where an agent, typically an attorney, participated in the me-
diation instead of the principal. 166 Under traditional agency analysis,
a principal is bound by the acts of the agent acting within the scope of
her authority.167 The courts, however, have not been consistent in
applying agency analysis to cases involving contested mediation agree-
ments.' 68 Some courts have upheld mediated settlement agreements
made by attorneys on behalf of their clients, based on traditional
agency analysis, 169 while others require direct participation by the
parties. 70
not represented by counsel during the mediation; (3) the mediator did not advise her
of her rights. The court noted that the parties did not sign a consent to arbitrate and
that the form they did sign did not "advise unrepresented parties that their agree-
ment to mediate their dispute would be treated as though it were a legally enforcea-
ble arbitration award." The court was troubled by the agreement because it was
unclear as to whether it had been made under duress and thus denied the motion to
enforce the agreement. See also Cafferata v. Peyser, 597 A.2d 1101 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1991) (holding that medical malpractice action was not barred by reason of
parties' pro se settlement of related claim in mediation-type proceedings); cf. Fischer
v. Heck, 675 A.2d 254 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (holding that tenant's com-
plaint against landlord for return of security deposit not barred by settlement of re-
lated claims).
166 See Banks, 887 S.W.2d at 160.
167 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY:. LIBarY BASED UPON AGENCY PRiNCr-
PLFs § 140 cmt. a (1958).
168 In Kaiser Foundation Health Plan v. Doe, the court upheld a lawyer-controlled
mediation agreement based on agency theory. Kaiser Found. Health Plan v. Doe 903
P.2d 375, 378 (Or. Ct. App. 1995), opinion modified on reconsideration, 908 P.2d 850
(Or. Ct. App. 1996), review denied, 927 P.2d 600 (Or. 1996). One of the problems with
some attorneys' behavior in mediation is the lack of a meaningful informed consent
doctrine to govern the lawyer-client relationship. Cf. Carr v. Runyan, 89 F.3d 327 (7th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 962 (1997) (applying agency theory and apparent
authority where mother sent daughter to represent her in mediation).
169 E.g., Carr, 89 F.3d at 327 (upholding a settlement agreement when a daughter
acted as agent for mother); Kaiser, 903 P.2d at 375; Koval v. Simon-Telelect, Inc., 693
N.E.2d 1299 (Ind. 1998) (holding that attorney has inherent power to settle claim
when attorney attends settlement procedure governed by Rules for Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution (ADR) if parties are directed or agree to appear by authorized repre-
sentatives); Scott v. Randle, 697 N.E.2d 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (enforcing settlement
agreement where attorney had actual and apparent authority to settle but had not
obtained consent of each client).
170 See Murphy v. Padilla, 49 Gal. Rptr. 2d 722, 727-28 (Gal. Ct. App. 1996). The
court's language is significant:
The litigants' direct participation tends to ensure that the settlement is the
result of their mature reflection and deliberate assent. This protects the par-
ties against hasty and improvident settlement agreements by impressing
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Mediation consent cases have also arisen in connection with
mandatory, court-ordered mediation programs. 17 1 Consent is usually
a nonissue as statutes and court rules typically require attendance and
more often, "good faith participation."1 72 Courts have imposed sanc-
tions for failure to attend mediation 17 3 but have not required that par-
ties reach a settlement in mediation.
174
E. What Is Missing from the Current Landscape?
The current mediation landscape does not yet include a working
principle of informed consent. While scholars have acknowledged
the importance of the idea of informed consent in promoting fair-
ness, the practice of informed consent falls short of this ideal. Regula-
tions support the concept of informed consent through disclosure
and consent requirements but show little appreciation of their consti-
tutive elements. Process information is typically privileged over out-
come information. The parties' understanding of disclosures is too
often assumed.
1. Inadequacy of Disclosure and Consent
Disclosure provisions are generally limited to information about
the mediation process, i.e., duties of the mediator, rules of confidenti-
ality, costs, and conflict of interest. Little attention has been focused
upon them the seriousness and finality of the decision to settle, and mini-
mizes the possibility of conflicting interpretations of the settlement.
Id. (quoting Levy v. Superior Ct., 896 P.2d 171, 175 (Cal. 1995)).
171 See ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 81.
172 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN., tit. 34, Rules for ADR, Rule 2.1 (West 1996) (requir-
ing parties to mediate in good faith but not requiring them to settle); see also English,
supra note 133; Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What
Form of Participation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079 (1993).
173 See Triad Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Clement Bros. Co., 438 S.E.2d 485, 488
(N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming default judgment for failure to attend court-ordered
mediated settlement conference).
174 See Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding
mandatory referral to an ADR procedure but not mandatory settlement); see also State
v. Carter, 658 N.E.2d 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). In this case the court made it clear
that there are other goals in mediation besides settlement:
Settlement of the whole case is not the only goal of mediation; 'agreement'
is another goal, whether it be a factual stipulation, an agreement to forego
jury trial in favor of binding arbitration, an identification of issues, a reduc-
tion of misunderstandings, a clarification of priorities, or a location of points
of agreement. Thus, even where the odds of resolution are slim, mediation
can be beneficial because other goals might be achieved.
Id. at 623.
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on the kind of information that promotes informed outcomes. Disclo-
sures about the consensual nature of the mediation process fail to ad-
equately address the various dimensions of the consent process.
The current regulatory structure fails to distinguish the different
levels of consent required at each stage of mediation decisionmaking.
There is an unstated assumption that consent is a package deal, that
consent to enter into the mediation process means consent to con-
tinue participation and consent to reaching an agreement. This
lumping together of consent is problematic. Moreover, it ignores the
possibility that informed consent may include informed refusals to
participate in mediation.1 7 5
2. Failure to Account for Understanding
Current disclosure standards fall to emphasize the importance of
understanding, a fundamental requirement of self-determination. 176
It matters little if parties are told that mediation is a process of assisted
negotiation if they do not understand the continuing consensual na-
ture of mediation, the process of reaching an agreement, and the con-
tents of the agreement itself.177 Unrepresented parties, in particular,
need to understand the full ramifications of a mediated settlement
agreement. They need to understand, for example, that a settlement
accomplished through mediation might preclude them from bringing
a future claim based on the same incident. 178 This type of disclosure
175 Cf Elysa Gordon, Multiculturalism in Medical Decisionmaking: The Notion of In-
formed Waivers, 23 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 1321 (1996).
176 Some notable exceptions include: N.C. STANDARDS OF PROF'L CONDucT, N.C.
R. OF CT., R. OF THE N.C. S. CT. FOR THE Disp. RESOL. COMM'N, N.C. STANDARDS OF
PROF'L CoNDUCT, Standard IV (Adopted May 10, 1996) (providing that the mediator
should make reasonable efforts to ensure that each party understands the mediation
process, the role of the mediator and the party's options within the process); ILL. CT.
R. AND PROC., REVISED ADMIN. ORDERS OF THE CIR. CT. OF THE llthJuD. Cm. APP. D.,
STANDARDS AND PROC. FOR MCLEAN CoUNTY CT.-REFERRED DIVORCE MEDIATION, Stan-
dard XI (providing that the mediator should promote equal understanding by the
participants).
177 See Beryl Blaustone, Training the Modern Lauyer: Incorporating the Study of Media-
tion into Required Law School Courses, 21 Sw. U.L. REv. 1317, 1330, n.29 (1992) (stating
that understanding is necessary for meaningful informed consent).
178 For example, the elderly woman who agrees in mediation to accept $100 as
settlement for her slip-and-fall injuries should be made aware that any future injuries
that arise out of the same accident may not be compensable because of the settlement
of this suit in mediation. Language to this effect is contained on the stipulation of
settlement form which is signed by parties who successfully mediate disputes in New
York City's small claims courts: "Upon such payment all parties shall be released from
liability to each other concerning the matters in this dispute." (form on file with the
author).
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may not produce a high success rate of settlements, but it increases
the likelihood of results that are fair and substantially just.
IV. TOWARD A THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT FOR MEDIATION
I now address the central inquiry of this article-what does the
principle of informed consent require for disclosure and consent in
mediation? The response to this normative question develops the be-
ginning of a framework within which to fashion a usable body of legal
rules to guide mediation practice. 79
I have suggested that the principle of informed consent matters
in mediation because it serves the same function as courts in promot-
ing fairness. A robust theory of informed consent requires that par-
ties be educated about mediation before they consent to participate in
it, that their continued participation and negotiations be voluntary,
and that they understand the outcomes to which they agree. In-
formed consent serves the values of autonomy, human dignity, and
efficiency. It guards against coercion, ignorance, and incapacity that
can impede the consensual underpinnings of the mediation process.
But to say this is just the beginning of the inquiry. A theory of in-
formed consent for mediation must take into account not only the
relationship between the principle of informed consent and the val-
ues it serves, but how this principle should operate in the parties' deci-
sionmaking acts, the practices which foster it, and its limitations.
A. Informed Decisionmaking: A Foundational Value
A principle of informed consent for mediation should focus
broadly on the parties' acts of decisionmaking throughout the media-
tion process.'80 Decisionmaking is the operative concept.' 8 ' The pur-
pose of disclosure is not to engage parties in the mediation process or
to commit them to a particular result. Rather, disclosure should assist
parties in understanding relevant information and educate them so
that they may make informed choices about whether or not to partici-
pate in mediation and whether or not to continue their participation
179 This whole area is complicated by a number of considerations which I will
defer until Part V of this Article, for example, whether there is representation of the
parties, the place where mediation occurs, and how concerns about neutrality can be
accommodated.
180 Such a focus does not privilege the specific act of consenting to participate in
the mediation process. Cf Goldstein, supra note 72, at 691 (arguing in the medical
context for a focus on decisionmaking without giving bias to consent).
181 A number of mediation scholars emphasize the importance of decisionmaking.
See, e.g., Lande, supra note 103; Riskin, supra note 92; Stulberg, supra note 57.
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in mediation.8 2 Consent to continued participation in mediation is
not a fait accompli simply because disclosures have been given. In
short, disclosure is not simply about informing, but about educating
parties toward greater understanding. 83
Informed consent analysis in mediation has focused on compet-
ing views of what values matter: 84 self-determination or informed
decisionmaking, neutrality or fairness. 85 Discussion then proceeds as
to what value trumps the other or how to balance competing goals.186
In my view, informed decisionmaking should be understood not as a
competing value, but as a prerequisite for the exercise of self-determi-
nation.187 When parties understand what they are doing in the media-
tion process and what they are not doing, when they understand what
their agreements mean and what legal entitlements they may have
waived in making such agreements, then they may be said to have
truly exercised self-determination.
B. Decisionmaking Models in Mediation
Informed consent is the vehicle through which autonomy and
self-determination are measured in mediation. These values do not
operate in a vacuum but become operative throughout the parties'
acts of decisionmaking, as well as in the final agreement. Thus, essen-
tial to any discussion of informed consent in mediation is an under-
standing of mediation decisionmaking188 In this section, I sketch
182 See Lande, supra note 103, at 866-79.
183 For an elaboration of this concept in the physician-patient relationship, see
ROBERT A. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS 124-43 (1979) (calling for increased
conversation as part of an informed consent doctrine).
184 Similar value debates have also occurred in the legal and medical professions.
In medicine, the debate has been patient autonomy versus health-related values. See
APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 25, at 130-48. In law, it has been client-versus-lawyer
autonomy. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
185 See, e.g., NANCY H. ROGERS & RICHARD A. SALEM, A STUDENT's GUIDE TO MEDIA-
TION AND THE LAW 137-48 (1987).
186 See, e.g., Margaret L. Shaw, Does a Mediator Have an Affirmative Duty To Assure
That Consent To Settle Is Truly Informed?, 1998 A.B.A SEC. DIsP. RESOL. ("At the heart of
what we are trying to do when we examine our responsibility for claims or defenses
not raised by parties or their counsel is to balance the goals in mediation of self-
determination and informed decisionmaking."); see also Bush, supra note 13; Stark,
supra note 80.
187 See Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation, supra note 16, at 47.
188 I note here the valuable contribution of Professor Leonard Riskin's work on
mediator orientations in which he presents a conceptual model for understanding
the kinds of problems brought to mediation and the role of mediators in working
with them. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7 (1996). My lens,
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four models of decisionmaking that are based on differing relation-
ships that can exist between mediators and disputing parties. Unlike
other mediation models described in the empirical and theoretical
literature, 189 my focus is not with the mediators' but with the dispu-
tants' behavior.'90 My purpose in this section1 91 is neither to evaluate
nor to recommend, but to explain how parties exercise autonomy and
self-determination in mediation in order to elaborate a theory of in-
formed consent that accommodates the realities of practice.192 The
principle of informed consent does not depend for its vitality on any
particular practice model but must be operationalized in all decision-
making models.
however, is different. I focus on the parties to the dispute and on their exercise of
autonomy in decisionmaking rather than on activity by the mediator.
189 A number of mediation models and styles have been identified in the theoreti-
cal and empirical literature. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BUSH &JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROM-
ISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND
REcOGNrrlON (1994) (describing transformative mediation); DEBORAH KOLB, WHEN
TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS (1994) (describing range of mediator prac-
tices); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE: CoNFLICT TRANSFORMATION
ACROSS CULTURES (1995) (describing prescriptive and elective mediation training
models); Alfini, supra note 66; Jeanne M. Brett et al., Mediator Style and Mediation
Effectiveness, 2 NEGOTIATIONJ. 277 (1986) (describing shuttle diplomacy and deal-mak-
ing); Freshman, supra note 107 (community enhancing model); Kenneth Kressel et
al., The Settlement-Orientation vs. The Problem-Solving Style in Custody Mediation, 50 J. Soc.
ISSUES 67 (1994); Joel Kurtzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law:
Designing an Interest and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation, 1997J. Disp.
RESOL. 53 (interest-based and rights-based model); Riskin, supra note 188; Susan S.
Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 J.L. & POL'Y 7 (1986) (describ-
ing bargaining and a therapeutic style of mediation); Ellen A. Waldman, The Challenge
of Certification: How to Ensure Mediator Competence While Preserving Diversity, 30 U.S.F. L.
REv. 723 (1996) (describing norm-generating, norm-educating and norm-advocating
models); Waldman, Social Norms, supra note 106. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms, and
Practices, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 217 (1995).
190 Although much has been written on the variety of mediator styles, there is less
understanding on how these styles affect the interchange between disputing parties
and the mediator.
191 See infra Part V where I suggest using an informative decisionmaking model
for unrepresented parties in mandatory court mediation.
192 In constructing these models, I have adapted the work of Ezekiel and Linda
Emanuel whose comprehensive research in bioethics has informed much of the cur-
rent informed consent discussion in clinical medical practice. Noting the struggle in
the medical profession over the patient's role in decisionmaking, these authors re-
sponded to the question of what should be the ideal relationship between physician
and patient and identified several decisionmaking models. See Emmanuel & Emman-
uel, supra note 29. In this Article, I collapse their interpretive into the informative
model. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
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1. Four Models of Autonomy
The exercise of autonomy in mediation may be understood
through four models of mediator-party relationships: paternalistic, in-
strumentalist, informative, and deliberative. 19 3 These relationships
determine the kind of autonomous decisionmaking that occurs. 19 4
In the paternalistic or "dictated autonomy" model, the mediator
acts primarily as the parties' surrogate in assessing what outcome
might be best. The parties' decisionmaking is supported by the medi-
ator's presentation of selected information as well as by the mediator's
explicit opinion of what should be done. 195 Autonomy is exercised
not only by the parties' agreement to mediate, but by their concur-
rence in the mediator's determination of what is best.
In the instrumentalist or "limited autonomy" model, the parties'
objective is simply to reach settlement. Their decisionmaking is
strongly influenced by the mediator's presentation of selected infor-
mation to each party to close the deal. The mediator highlights risks
over any other kind of information-'You never know how the judge
will rule.'u 9 6 The presumption is that taking the offer would signal
that the case would be over. Autonomy is primarily exercised by the
parties' agreement to mediate because the mediator exercises subtle
influence to close the deal to reach agreement.
In the informative or "assisted autonomy" model, the mediator
acts as an information conduit, providing parties with information
that is relevant to their needs and interests.' 97 Receiving this techni-
cal expertise gives parties the means to exercise control. The media-
tor also assists parties in exploring individual values and in selecting
outcome options that realize those values. The parties make the ulti-
193 Several mediation models described in the theoretical and empirical literature
may fit different parts of the decisionmaking models which I describe. In this Article,
however, I deliberately do not try to match my descriptions with existing models. As
with the physician-patient models described by the Emmanuels, these models do not
reflect reality but are "Weberian ideal types." Emmanuel & Emmanuel, supra note 29,
at 2221. See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
(1947).
194 Although these models reflect styles that can be combined, they are each
distinguishable.
195 Unrepresented parties would be most vulnerable under the paternalistic
model.
196 The Emmanuels refuse to elaborate on the instrumentalist model, associating
it with morally objectionable cases. See Emmanuel & Emmanuel, supra note 29, at
2222. My purpose in using it is purely descriptive. For a description of instrumental-
ism, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Coherentism, 50 SMU L. REv. 1679, 1692 (1997).
197 This may include information related to both legal and nonlegal interests and
to the parties' sense of fairness and justice.
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mate decision about what values matter and what outcome should be
pursued. Decisionmaking is influenced by the factual and substantive
information given by the mediator, and autonomy is maximized
through the parties' use of information to control ultimate
decisionmaking.
Finally, in the deliberative or "reflective autonomy" model,19 8 the
mediator provides parties with the same factual and legal information
described in the informative model but also helps the parties under-
stand, articulate, and finally, choose the values that should govern
their ultimate choices. Disputing parties are encouraged not simply
to examine personal preferences, but to consider-through consulta-
tive processes, deliberation, and dialogue-alternative choices, their
worthiness, and their implications for settlement. Decisionmaking is
influenced by activist mediator behavior in helping parties expand ap-
preciation of values and then choose the values that are important in
resolving their disputes. The mediator engages in moral deliberation
and helps the parties prioritize preferences. Coercion is avoided. Au-
tonomy is expressed in self-understanding and moral self-develop-
ment. Disputing parties come to know more clearly who they are and
how the various outcome options affect their knowledge of self and
their identity.
These models offer competing conceptions of autonomous deci-
sionmaking and may operate in all the disparate conditions in which
mediation occurs: with represented and unrepresented parties, in vol-
untary or mandatory, private or court-connected mediation pro-
grams.1 9 9 A robust theory of informed consent must accommodate
the reality of these different decisionmaking models, and the ele-
ments of disclosure and consent that I discuss in the following section
must be operationalized within all of them.
198 There is a rich literature that calls for greater deliberation in client counseling.
See, e.g., Colin Croft, Reconceptualizing American Legal Professionalism: A Proposal forDelib-
erative Moral Community, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1256 (1992); Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and
Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 885 (1996);
Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue Be Taught to Lawyers?, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1759 (1993); Peter
Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?" Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal
Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REv. 213 (1990).
199 Skilled mediation advocates would be able to help their clients make choices
about an appropriate or desirable type of mediator-party relationship. Unrepre-
sented parties generally lack this ability. See infta notes 271-87 and accompanying
text (discussing the mediator's disclosure duties with respect to unrepresented
parties).
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C. Disclosure and Consent Standards in Mediation
The principle of informed consent in mediation honors the val-
ues of autonomy, human dignity, and efficiency. What do these values
imply about the kind of information that should be disclosed to par-
ties in mediation in order to achieve good consent? Informed deci-
sionmaking and the exercise of self-determination in mediation
presupposes capacity to choose and knowledge to make choices.200
Several commentators have considered the factors that affect whether
consent in mediation is voluntary and educated: the extent to which
there are time pressures, coercion, information gaps, incapacity, lan-
guage barriers, power imbalances, and the ability of parties to reject
proposals. 20 1 In the following section, my focus will be on the infor-
mational aspects of consent.
1. Elements of Disclosure
Knowledge is a critical source of power in negotiations20 2 and the
key component that distinguishes "raw" from "informed" consent in
mediated negotiations. The issue of disclosure raises some of the
most troublesome questions affecting the mediation profession today.
What kind of disclosure is needed for good decisionmaking? What is
the appropriate scope of disclosure? How should it be effectuated?
Who is the agent of disclosure? What is the role of law?
There are two aspects of disclosure in mediation. The first relates
to information that parties should have before making an educated
decision about whether or not to enter into the mediation process. I
will call this information "participation disclosure." The second as-
pect of disclosure relates to the information parties need in order to
reach an informed and fair outcome. I will call this information "out-
come disclosure."
The information contained in "participation disclosure" should
inform parties about the nature and purpose of the mediation pro-
cess. It should promote their general understanding of how media-
200 In this Article, I include information as part of knowledge.
201 See, e.g., Boskey, supra note 114, at 370 (ability to reject proposals); Bush, supra
note 13 (describing power imbalance); Lande, supra note 103, at 866-79, 898 (listing
seven factors that may be used to form a continuum of quality of consent in media-
tion); Craig A. McEwen & RichardJ. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achiev-
ing Compliance Through Consent, 18 L. & Soc'y REV. 11 (1984) (ability to reject
proposals).
202 See, e.g., DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENHJS, Tim MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR:
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIV GAIN 257 (1986); cf. DAVID SA osy, -
KNOWLEDGE As PowEm PoLrnCAL AND LEGAL CONTROL OF INFORMATION (1990).
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tion differs from adjudication, the mediator's role and how it differs
from that of an arbitrator or judge,20 3 the specific norms that will gov-
ern the procedural aspects of the process, 20 4 and the rules governing
consent.
"Outcome disclosure" requires that parties have a general under-
standing of the relevant facts and understand their own interests and
values.2 0 5 I am not suggesting that the level of factual detail be as
great as what might be achieved through the discovery process,20 6 but
it should be reasonably sufficient for the parties to make agreements
based on sound judgment. "Outcome disclosure" also requires infor-
mation about relevant legal and social norms. The location where
mediation occurs determines the context of such disclosures. 20 7
Many commentators have argued for greater disclosure require-
ments.20 8 More disclosure will not guarantee that parties will actually
203 Implicit in any discussion of the mediator's role is an explanation of either the
kinds of decisionmaking relationships that can exist between parties and the mediator
or the individual mediator's view of the decisionmaking relationship between parties
and the mediator. The point is that parties need to be able to make knowledgeable
choices about the kind of mediation process in which they will participate.
204 This explanation is contextual and depends upon where the mediation occurs.
In the informal courts, for example, in addition to explaining the process of media-
tion, it is important to explain the legal effect of a mediated settlement agreement
and what can be done if the agreement is violated. Additionally, in settings where
different process options are available, such as mediation and arbitration, parties
should understand the differences between these processes.
205 A recent study conducted by the Rand Institute suggests that if a party's infor-
mational needs are not met by obtaining the kind of information provided through
discovery, that may be an impediment to settlement in mediation. Thus, if cases are
referred to mediation before sufficient discovery has been completed, they may not
settle. See RAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
206 I recognize that such an approach could be used to make mediation as costly
and lawyer-dependent as litigation and arbitration. Some court rules, however, do
require discovery in mediation. See, e.g., IOWA R. GOVERNING STANDARDS OF PIRAC. FOR
LAWYER MEDIATORS IN F.AM. DIsp. 4 ("The mediator shall assure that there is full finan-
cial and factual disclosure, such as each would reasonably receive in the discovery
process, or that the participants have sufficient information to waive intelligently the
right to such disclosure."); KAN. R. RELATING TO MEDIATION 901; Cf. ILL. R. RELATING
TO MEDIATION 1.A.2 (mediation should be based on full disclosure of all facts related
to the dispute so that a fair and equitable agreement can be reached).
207 In settings such as courts or administrative agencies where legal consequences
may attach, parties should have access to information regarding options offered by
alternative legal processes or know that they are deliberating without such knowledge.
208 See, e.g., Helm, supra note 74, at 70 (1988) (arguing that mediators disclose the
risks of confidentiality and possible loss of privacy if mediator has a duty to warn of
threats); Imperati, supra note 73, at 742-43 (listing nineteen items which mediators
should disclose); Lande, supra note 103; Moffitt, supra note 108 (arguing for disclo-
sure of mediator style). It should be noted that in some mediation programs, parties
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use the information 20 9 or even make reasonable decisions but, cou-
pled with understanding, it should contribute to educated decision-
making. There is, however, a danger in disclosure overload. If too
much information is lumped under the umbrella of informed con-
sent, then the principle is both too broad and too narrow and is not
likely to be helpful. As I discuss in Part V, the challenge, in imple-
menting the principle of informed consent in practice, is to tailor dis-
closure to the informational needs of the parties.210
2. Elements of Consent
There is a great deal of muddled thinking about the concept of
consent in mediation. Under the prevailing regulatory structure,
there is often a subtle assumption that if parties consent to enter into
the mediation process, they have also consented to: a) continued par-
ticipation and negotiations in mediation, b) reaching an agreement in
mediation, and c) accepting the outcome that is reached. Each of
these processes, however, are separate aspects of mediation decision-
making that require consent. Parties must understand this and know
that they can walk away from mediation at any time during the
process.
Meaningful consent must be voluntary and should be given with
an understanding of its attendant consequences. 211 Consent to par-
ticipate in the mediation process, what I will call "participation con-
sent," has several dimensions. It involves a conscious, knowledgeable
decision to enter into the mediation process and to continue partici-
pating in mediation through good faith negotiations. 212 This is more
have disclosure responsibilities towards each other. See, e.g., Nevada, Family Media-
tion Program in the Family Division, Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County,
Mediation Rules: "(3) Disclosure in mediation: Parties are expected to share all infor-
mation pertinent to the issues in the presence of both parties." (copy on file with
author).
209 Even when parties have knowledge of their rights, it does not mean that they
will exercise these rights to the detriment of mediation.
210 See infra Part V.
211 Professor James Boskey suggests three components to voluntariness: 1) each
party must understand that they can walk away from the mediation process, 2) no
factual misunderstandings exist that the mediator could have corrected or that the
mediator created to force a settlement, 3) the mediator should inform each party if
they are wrong about the law governing an issue. See Boskey, supra note 114, at 370.
212 One of my students in the Fordham Law School Mediation Clinic observed
about her experience in Manhattan Small Claims Court that "participation consent"
was achieved with little effort:
During my limited mediation experience, I found that for the most part, it
was not difficult to get the parties to consent to mediation. The usual hesi-
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than a matter of signing a form agreement to mediate. It involves an
ongoing commitment to honor the integrity of the mediation process.
"Participation consent" is a fluid concept that develops more fully
over time and is strengthened as parties gain trust in the mediator.
2 13
Trust is an important part of the mediation process and enhances the
fiduciary relationship between the mediator and disputing parties.2 14
Mediators gain their power from the consent of the disputing parties.
To the extent that parties do not trust the mediator, the mediator's
influence is weakened 215 and the parties' participation consent is
diluted. 2
16
Consent to the outcome reached in mediation, what I will call
"outcome consent," involves a separate decision to accept the agree-
ment that is reached with an understanding of its content, its conse-
quences, and what options are being waived by such consent. This
requires sufficient factual and substantive information. In this sense
then, disclosure and consent are linked concepts and, without suffi-
cient disclosures, "outcome consent" is suspect.
tancy stemmed from either not understanding the process and the fact that
they were not obligated to participate in mediation or from a desire on the
part of the parties to 'see the judge.' After a bit more of a methodical ap-
proach to explaining the process and what their options were, all of the
parties readily consented to the mediation process and were willing to
proceed.
(copy on file with author).
213 This point is well stated by Suzanne Terry:
This increased trust is gained by the mediator's restatement of issues, correct
interpretation of feelings, and maintenance of enough order during the pro-
cess so that each party feels both freedom for self-expression and sufficient
restraint not to exceed limits. As trust grows, the parties may allow the medi-
ator more liberties in exploring substantive issues and emotional responses
to the content and steps of the process.
Suzanne Terry, Conciliation: Responses to the Emotional Content of Disputes, MEDIATION Q.,
Summer 1987, at 45. The role of trust in mediation may depend in large measure
upon context. In the sometimes chaotic settings of one session mediations that occur
in the informal courts, it may be more difficult to establish a trust relationship than in
a custody or divorce mediation that may involve several sessions. In general, the role
of trust in mediation is understudied and merits further theoretical and empirical
research.
214 See William Ross &Jessica LaCroix, Multiple Meanings of Trust in Negotiation The-
ory and Research: A Literature Review and Integrative Model, 7 INT'L J. CoNFLIar McMTr.
314, 317 (1996).
215 See Mayer, supra note 71.
216 The meaning of trust differs depending upon the relationship between the
negotiating parties and the mediator. For an extensive review of the literature on
trust in negotiation and mediation, see Ross & LaCroix, supra note 214.
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D. Waiver of Informed Consent Rights
Waiver is an exception to the legal doctrine of informed con-
sent.2 17 It is generally defined as a voluntary and intentional relin-
quishment of a known right.2 1 8 There are two dimensions of waiver in
mediation practice. First, parties may waive the disclosure of informa-
tion related to the mediation process,21 9 discovery, and information
about their legal rights. 220 The second aspect of waiver relates to legal
entitlements. By agreeing to attempt to resolve disputes through the
mediation process, parties may, in effect, be waiving their right to seek
redress through the formal legal system and the right to receive the
benefits of that system.22' The elements of a valid waiver in mediation
require at a minimum that parties know they have a right to certain
disclosures, as well as the right to their legal entitlements and to make
alternative agreements in mediation.
217 Other exceptions include therapeutic privilege and emergency situations. See
APPELBAUM ET Au., supra note 25, at 66-79.
218 SeeJOHN D. CALAmAR &JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRAS 836 (3d
ed. 1987) (citing 28 AM.JUR. 2d, Esto*pel and Waiver § 154 (1966)). The elements of a
valid waiver in the physician-patient relationship require that patients know they have
a right of waiver. Patients must know that physicians have a duty to disclose certain
information, that they have the legal right to make decisions about their treatment
that cannot be rendered without their consent, and that decisionmaking includes the
right to refuse treatment. See APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 25, at 70.
219 See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
220 For an excellent discussion of the right not to receive information, see
Gordon, supra note 175.
221 The stakes could be significant. Consider the case of Liebeck v. McDonald, No.
CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994). The defendant declined to
settle the case based on the mediator's recommendation of $225,000, and a jury
awarded the plaintiff $160,000 in compensatory damages. See Elizabeth Sherowski,
Hot Coffee, Cold Cash: Making the Most of Alternative Dispute Resolution in High-Stakes Per-
sonalInjury Lawsuits, 11 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. REsOL. 521, 522 (1996); see also Samuel R.
Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: CivilJury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1996). Parties may also be unwittingly waiving other rights when
they enter into the mediation process. One commentator has suggested that because
mediators do not always disclose to parties the limits of confidentiality that they may
have a duty to warn parties that they may be waiving privacy rights. See Helm, supra
note 74, at 69. The question of waiver comes up in different contexts in mediation.
Another commentator has suggested that with respect to the issue of conflicts of inter-
est, "mediators face broader conflicts than attorneys representing clients." John Bick-
erman, Handling Potential Conflicts in Mediation, 14 ALTERNATVES TO THE HIGH COST
OF LrrG. 83 (1996). "[1]n the adversarial context, as a rule, an attorney can never
switch sides in a litigation despite the parties' informed consent. Mediation may pose
similar non-waivable conflicts that outweigh the parties' preference for a particular
mediator." Id.
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What does the principle of informed consent require for waivers
in mediation? As a general proposition, a waiver of rights requires
sufficient knowledge, understanding, and voluntariness. Where waiv-
ers of constitutional rights are involved, a great deal of understanding
and knowledge is required.222 Likewise, in tort law, where parties
enter into exculpatory agreements, substantial disclosure and under-
standing is necessary, particularly if the parties have minimal educa-
tion, resources, and/or bargaining power.223  In mandatory
arbitration cases where parties waive the right to participate in a judi-
cial forum, courts require a "knowing and voluntary" waiver. 224
Under what circumstances should waivers be honored in media-
tion? Some mediation regulations recognize the right to waive the
222 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (holding that an explicit
statement of waiver is not invariably necessary to support a finding that defendant
waived the right to remain silent or the right to counsel guaranteed by the Miranda
case); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938) ("'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamen-
tal constitutional rights (quoting Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393
(1937) .... ")); see a/soJonathan A. Damon, "Far From a Mere Formalism": The Importance
of Informing an Accused of Her Indictment After Patterson v. Illinois and Harvey v. Michi-
gan, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 93, 130-31 (1991-92).
223 See, e.g., William K. Jones, Private Revision of Public Standards: Exculpatory Agree-
ments in Leases, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 717 (1988) (arguing against exculpatory clauses in
residential leases).
224 Some courts have refused to uphold mandatory arbitration agreements where
employees had not knowingly waived their rights. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.
v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995) (court reversed
order compelling arbitration where employee did not knowingly enter into agree-
ment to arbitrate employment dispute). In the culture of employment arbitration,
prospective employees typically sign agreements to arbitrate all disputes that arise in
connection with their employment. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
895 F.2d 195, 200 (4th Cir. 1990) (enforcing agreement compelling arbitration of all
claims arising out of employment when claim against employer was one for violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)). Compare Duffield v. Robert-
son Stephens & Son, 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S.Ct. 445 (1998)
(distinguishing post-1991 Title VII claims from the pre-1990 ADEA claims found arbi-
trable in Gilmer and holding that under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, employees may
not be required, as a condition of employment, to waive their right to bring future
Title VII claims in court); with Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 121 F.3d 702
(4th Cir. 1997), judgment vacated 1998 U.S. LEXIS 7270 (Nov. 16, 1998) (holding that
union-negotiated waiver of employees' statutory right to ajudicial forum for claims of
employment discrimination must be "clear and unmistakable").
Congress has amended the ADEA to provide that all waivers of rights under the
Act must be "knowing and voluntary." Older Workers Benefit Program Act of 1990,
29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1) (1990). See generally Developments in the Law-Employment Discrim-
ination, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1677-79, 1684-85 (1996) (advocating a subjective
standard for a knowing waiver in mandatory arbitration).
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kind of factual information that might be disclosed through tradi-
tional discovery techniques.225 The American Arbitration Associa-
tion's Consumer Due Process Protocol for arbitration and mediation
permits consumers to waive any of the principles in the Protocol, in-
cluding fairness, if "they have sufficient specific knowledge and under-
standing of the rights they are waiving . -226 Some commentators
have suggested, however, that waivers not be permitted where power
imbalances are too great, 227 and at least one court has held that the
protection of confidentiality afforded to communications made dur-
ing mediation cannot be waived. 228
Certainly, permitting parties to waive the right to receive informa-
tion in mediation is consistent with the values honored by informed
consent and respects individual competence to engage in autono-
mous decisionmaking.229 Likewise, permitting parties to waive legal
entitlements that a court might award them is consistent with the val-
ues supported by informed consent. It is questionable, however,
whether waivers that affect the normative standard of fairness in medi-
ation should ever be permitted, although I recognize that this may
smack of the very paternalism that the principle of informed consent
is designed to avoid. Nevertheless, as a matter of public policy there
are some waivers that the law does not enforce; I would include in this
category waivers which implicate fairness. 230
V. INTEGRATING INFORMED CONSENT THEORY AND PRACTICE
How can the principle of informed consent be honored in media-
tion? Integrating disclosure and consent principles into mediation
225 See, e.g., IOwA R. GOVERNING STANDARDS OF PRAC. FOR LAWvER MEDIATORS IN
FAm. Dxsp. 4(A) (1989).
226 CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 57, at 36 (identifying specific
minimum due process standards that embody the concept of fundamental fairness,
including informed consent). See generally ThomasJ. Stipanowich, Resolving Consumer
Disputes: Due Process Protocol Protects Consumer Rights, 53 Disp. RESOL. J. 8 (1998).
227 See, e.g., Waldman, Multiple Model Approach, supra note 106, at 740-42 (discuss-
ing circumstances under which parties would not be allowed to waive social and legal
norms); Stulberg, Fairness, supra note 57, at 945 (proposing that a uniform mediation
statute contain a nonwaivable right to counsel).
228 See People v. Snyder, 492 N.Y.S.2d 890, 891-92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
229 See Goldstein, supra note 72, at 686.
230 In my view, information about the mediation process is essential to secure con-
sent to participate. Participation disclosure information, therefore, should be
nonwaivable unless a person is well-versed in the mediation process. See generally
Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983)
(describing three different forms of paternalism in which law does not allow people
to waive rights).
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practice raises critical questions about the practical possibilities for
achieving educated decisionmaking in all the disparate circumstances
and conditions under which mediation occurs. Parties come to medi-
ation in courts, community dispute centers, public agencies, and pri-
vate providers' offices with varying degrees of voluntariness and legal
representation. Mediation consumers range from sophisticated, re-
peat players who are represented by lawyers to illiterate and unrepre-
sented parties. How much disclosure is required in each of these
settings and who should provide it? Who should assure that parties
understand disclosures and who should determine the legitimacy of
their consent?
The trend has been to view the disclosure and consent require-
ments of informed consent regulations through a one-size-fits-all lens.
Regulatory structures typically treat all parties in the same manner.231
Statutes and court rules catalogue the various kinds of information
that must be disclosed and prescribe forms that parties sign as evi-
dence of legitimate "consent."23 2 The time has come to move beyond
this current monolithic vision of mediation practice and pay more at-
tention to context.233
A working theory of informed consent in mediation requires an
understanding, not only of the substance of the principle of informed
consent, but of the practices that foster it. I suggest a new direction
for informed consent practice in mediation. Disclosure and consent
requirements should be tailored to the informational needs of individ-
ual disputants. What disclosures will enhance this person's ability to
understand, define, and decide her dispute? Courts, public agencies,
private providers of mediation services, and lawyers who represent
parties in mediation all have informed consent responsibilities. 234 My
231 See infra notes 118-33 and accompanying text.
232 See supra Section III.B.
233 For a different claim that mediation fails to value context, see McEwen, supra
note 57, at 1353.
234 One of the overarching challenges for policymakers in developing informed
consent protocols is determining the disclosure and consent duties of all who offer
mediation services. In this regard, some commendable work has already begun. See
NATIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 118 (detailing information that courts should pro-
vide to judges, court personnel, the bar and parties and their attorneys); DRAFT PRrN-
CIPLFS FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS, CPR-GEORGETOWN COMMISSION (Oct.
1998) (proposing "reasonable disclosure of key information about ADR provider or-
ganizations"); SPIDR LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY COMMITTEE, MANDATED PARTICIPATION
AND SETrLmETrr COERCION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE COURTS 18
(1991) ("Mandatory participation should be used only when a high quality pro-
gram... provides clarity about the precise procedures that are required."); QUALIFY-
ING NEUTRALS: THE BASIC PRINCIPLES, REPORT OF SPIDR COMMISSION ON
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primary concern in this Article, however, is with the mediator's in-
formed consent duties.
A. The Mediator's Informed Consent Responsibilities
In Part I of this Article, I discussed how the legal doctrine of in-
formed consent governs decisionmaking between doctors and pa-
tients, and to a lesser extent, between lawyers and clients. In both of
these professional relationships we are careful to look at the basis of
consent rather than the consent itself because in both cases, the per-
son seeking the consent is a fiduciary of the one asked to give it, and
the fiduciary is hired for her specialized knowledge.2 35 Mediators,
likewise, are fiduciaries. They occupy a position of trust with disput-
ing parties, and it is important that a robust principle of informed
consent govern this fiduciary relationship.2 36
The mediator's informed consent duties arise out of the fiduciary
relationship established between the mediator and the disputing par-
QuALIrIcATIONs 8 (May 1989) ("programs offering dispute resolution services should
disclose their selection criteria"); AAA CONSUMER PROTOCOL, suprn note 57, at 15,
35-36; cf. Guthrie & Levin, supra note 1, at 900 (calling for courts to provide
premediation education); Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 189 (discussing media-
tion providers' responsibility to provide legal information).
235 These situations are quite different from buying a car, for example, where the
buyer is protected only by fraud law, which places a lower burden on the seller than
the doctrine of informed consent. In these cases, there is a need for disclosure be-
cause a reasonable person would need information and a basis for finding a duty.
Also in these situations, absent disclosures, the person is not really considered to have
consented because she did not know what she was agreeing to. Thus, the amount of
information is also important in determining if there is really consent.
236 Mediation practice reflects much of the informed consent culture of medicine
and law and thus it is tempting to conceptualize the mediator's role as similar to that
of the physician and the lawyer in securing informed consent. But there are impor-
tant functional differences between mediators, physicians and lawyers. First, the fidu-
ciary duties owed by mediators differ from those of physicians and lawyers. The
physician owes a duty only to his or her patient. The lawyer owes a duty to his or her
client and the court system. The mediator however, owes an obligation to both par-
ties to maintain the integrity of the mediation process. Second, the nature of deci-
sionmaking differs. Unlike clients and patients who "theoretically" engage in
collaborative decisionmaking with their physicians and lawyers, disputants' decision-
making in mediation is not done primarily in collaboration with the mediator but
with the other disputing party and also with their own lawyers if they have one. The
mediator simply assists the decisionmaking process. The nature of the fiduciary rela-
tionship between mediators and disputing parties merits extended discussion and is
beyond the scope of this Article. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing relationship of trust to "participation consent" in mediation). See Arthur
Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for Fiduciary Duties2, 53 Gn,,N. L. REv. 731
(1984).
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ties. Unlike physicians and attorneys, who owe a direct fiduciary duty
to their patients and clients, respectively, the mediator is said to repre-
sent the integrity of the mediation process and it is in this sense then
that the mediator has a special fiduciary relationship with both parties
to a dispute. This relationship is complicated, however, by the con-
cept of mediator impartiality, a value that is central in the mediation
process.23 7 Given the inherent boundaries of the fiduciary relation-
ship between the mediator and disputing parties, there is much dis-
cussion about what kind of information mediators can and should
provide. There is little dispute that mediators should provide infor-
mation to both parties about the nature of the mediation process, but
agreement stops there.238 Whether mediators should be permitted to
give more substantive information, professional evaluations, or opin-
ions is the subject of intense debate. 23 9
In my view, there are baseline levels of disclosure that must be
satisfied for all parties in mediation.240 Mediators should describe the
nature and purpose of the mediation process, the mediator's role,
and the norms that will govern the process.241 Parties should under-
stand that these norms may be negotiated and renegotiated through-
out the process. Likewise, parties should understand that if the
mediator learns information during the mediation session that would
result in one party making an agreement based on fraud or misrepre-
sentation, then the mediator will disclose that information before par-
ties consent to any outcome.242 These disclosures should be made
before parties begin to participate in mediation. 243 Finally, mediators
237 See JOINT STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, supra note 7 ("The concept of mediator
impartiality is central to the mediation process. A mediator shall mediate only those
matters in which she or he can remain impartial and evenhanded. If at any time the
mediator is unable to conduct the process in an impartial manner, the mediator is
obligated to withdraw.").
238 For a discussion of other kinds of information which commentators suggest
that mediators disclose to parties, see text accompanying notes 106-08.
239 Whether mediators can and should ever include evaluation in their services
depends upon one's conceptual understanding of mediation. See supra Part II.
240 See supra Part IV.
241 The parties should understand that their consent to continued participation in
mediation and to the outcome should be voluntary.
242 In this regard, see FLA. ST. MED. R. 10.110(3) (West 1997), which provides:
"Integrity of the Agreement. The mediator shall not knowingly assist the parties in
reaching an agreement which for reasons such as fraud, duress, overreaching, the
absence of bargaining ability, or unconscionability would be enforceable." See also
text accompanying notes 203-04 for a more detailed discussion of the elements of
"participation disclosure."
243 Such disclosures are not only required by the human dignity value of informed
consent, see supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text, but by some state regulations
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have a responsibility to insure that the parties have a minimum level
of understanding of the outcomes to which they agree. 244
B. Sliding-Scale Model of Informed Consent Disclosures
Beyond these baseline levels of disclosure, I propose a sliding-
scale model of informed consent disclosures. This suggests a contex-
tual approach that examines the location of mediation, voluntariness
of the parties' participation, and their representational status. Careful
consideration of a mediation's location helps to determine the par-
ties' reasonable expectations for the mediation process, the kinds of
disclosure that meets those expectations, and the level of consent nec-
essary to respect the values served by informed consent.2 45 Under a
sliding-scale model of informed consent disclosures, the mediator's
additional informed consent responsibilities correspond to the degree
to which parties participate in mediation voluntarily and to whether
they are represented by counsel.2 46 Parties who are represented by
attorneys and who voluntarily choose to mediate are in a significantly
different situation than unrepresented parties who are required to
mediate.247
1. Degrees of Voluntariness
a. Voluntary Mediation
The distinguishing characteristic of voluntary mediation is con-
sent. The parties consent to participate in mediation, to remain in
mediated negotiations, and to the outcome reached in mediation. 248
In a voluntary setting, the parties' expectations for mediation are
that require honesty between the parties in mediation. See, e.g., Nevada, Family Medi-
ation Program in the Family Division, SecondJudicial District Court, Washoe County,
Rule 3, n.243 (on file with author). Also see the text accompanying notes 205-07 for
a discussion of the elements of "outcome disclosure."
244 The extent of this responsibility depends upon whether the parties are repre-
sented by lawyers. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
245 See supra Part III.
246 This approach is similar to that followed by the SPIDR Commission on Qualifi-
cations which shows sensitivity to dispute context and assumes that mediator styles of
practice will differ depending on the context. See SPIDR REPORT, supra note 18; En-
suring Competence and Quality in Dispute Resolution Practice, in R'ORT 2 OF Tm SPIDR
COMMISSION ON QUALFICATIONs 5 (1995).
247 These parties can decide, for example, what kind of mediator relationship they
wish and their attorneys can inform them about the mediator's background.
248 See Boskey, supra note 114; Lande, supra note 103.
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based on a contractual relationship with the mediator.249 Parties bar-
gain for what they want in both a jurisdictional system-i.e., public,
court-connected, private provider-and in a mediator.250 Beyond the
basic disclosure requirements, therefore, the kind of information
that mediators provide would be governed by contract.251 Parties
might deliberately choose a decisionmaking model with strong media-
tor input as in the paternalistic or instrumentalist decisionmaking mod-
els,2 52 or they may opt for a more collaborative approach as in the
deliberative decisionmaking model.25 3 In short, a contractual approach
to informed consent gives parties a great deal of freedom in structur-
ing their own decisionmaking processes, and it may be helpful in
resolving some of the difficult problems affecting mediation practice
today.254
249 Because parties voluntarily choose to mediate, they have greater responsibility
in the decision to select a particular mediator. See DAFr PRNciPLEs FOR ADR PRO-
VIDER ORGANIZATIONS, CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N, at 8; SPIDR LAW AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY COMM., MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETrLEMENT COERCION: DISPUTE
RESOLUTION As IT RELATES TO THE COURTS (1991); cf. Schuck, supra note 29, at 906,
958 n.227 (citing authors who have proposed a contractual approach to informed
consent in medicine).
250 This approach is followed in the AAA CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 57, at
36.
Education of users should also include some treatment of the distinctive
styles and strategies employed by mediators .... Participants need to decide
in advance of selection the approach they want a mediator to adopt.
Id. Some sectors in private industry are also adopting this approach. The National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) requires more background information on
mediators so people know who they are choosing. See NAT'L ASS'N OF SECURITIES
DEALERS MEDIATION R. 10404(b) (1997). The construction industry is also supportive
of such disclosure. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Multi-Door Contract and Other Pos-
sibilities, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 303, 372 (1998). Finally, several commenta-
tors support the notion that mediators should disclose their styles of mediation so that
parties may bargain for their choice of style. See, e.g., Imperati, supra note 73; Lande,
supra note 103; Moffitt, supra note 108.
251 This approach gives guidance on the difficult issue of whether mediators
should give legal advice or identify legal issues. See, e.g., Imperati, supra note 73, at
738.
252 See supra Part IV.
253 See supra Part IV.
254 The facilitative versus evaluative conundrum, for example, could be under-
stood as an agreement for a process-driven or result-driven mediation. See Feerick et
al., supra note 87, at 103 (remarks of Professor Leonard Riskin).
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b. Mandatory Mediation
A mandatory mediation program is one in which the parties' par-
ticipation is compelled.2 55 Such programs are increasingly visible in
the private and public sector 256 and, in my view, it is unclear whether
the principle of informed consent can ever be truly satisfied with
them. What is certain, however, is that heightened protection should
be given to the principle of informed consent in mandatory media-
tion programs.2 57 A critical concern here is the extent to which com-
pulsion to enter the mediation process may stigmatize the
voluntariness of the outcomes that result. Thus, greater vigilance
should be directed toward helping parties achieve voluntary out-
comes.2 58 Parties must understand that their initial attendance at a
255 There are numerous critics of mandatory mediation programs. See Penelope
E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REv.
441, 441-46 (1992); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women,
100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1547, 1549-51 (1991); see also MARTHA A. FNEmAN, THE ILLUSION
OF EQuALrre. THE RHETORIC AND REAL=TY OF DrvoRcE REFORM 144-46 (1991); Andre
G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation for Battered Women, 15 HAuv. WOMEN'S
L.J. 272, 272-73 (1992); Robert Geffner & Mildred D. Pagelow, Mediation and Child
Custody Issues in Abusive Relationships, 8 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 151 (1990); Mary P. Treuthart,
In Harm's Way? Family Mediation and the Role of the Attorney Advocate, 23 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REv. 717, 721-31 (1993); Laurie Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women's Progress
on Family Law Issues, 19 CLEARINGHousE REv. 431, 435-36 (1985). But see Roselle L.
Wissler, The Effects of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on the Experience of Small
Claims and Common Pleas Courts, 33 WiLiMkTmr L. REV. 565 (1997) (reporting studies
in the small claims court context showing little support for claim that parties are pres-
sured to accept unfair settlements in mandatory mediation).
256 In private mediation settings, mandatory mediation clauses are adopted by in-
dustries and inserted into contracts. See, e.g., AAA CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note
57; see also ThomasJ. Stipanowich, On the CuttingEdge: Conflict Avoidance and Resolution
in the Construction Industry, in AMImCAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADR & THE LAW
65, 66-67 (1997) (noting growing use in construction industry); Stipanowich, supra
note 250, at 373 (discussing adoption of mandatory mediation clauses in architects
contracts).
257 There may be, for example, a stronger case for requiring disclosure of the
mediator's style and practices. Cf Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Con-
sent in Human Experimentation: Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Prac-
tice, 34 UCLA L. Ray. 67, 129 (1986).
258 For an example of an excellent court rule that shows such sensitivity, see MASS.
ST. CT. UNWF. R. ON Disp. RESOL. 6(i).
Inappropriate Pressures to Settle. Courts shall inform parties that, unless
otherwise required by law, they are not required to make offers and conces-
sions or to settle in a court-connected dispute resolution process. Courts
shall not impose sanctions for nonsettlement by the parties ....
Id. See also IND. CODE ANN., tit. 34, App. on ADR, Rule 2.1 (West 1996) (parties are
required to mediate in good faith but are not required to settle). See NATIONAL STAN-
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mediation session does not imply that they will continue negotiations
and reach an agreement. Mediators must understand the difference
between compulsion to enter into the mediation process and compul-
sion or coercion to continue negotiations in mediation, or to reach an
agreement. The latter behaviors have no place in a process labeled
"mediation."259
2. Location of Mediation
The location of mediation may have a considerable influence on
the parties' expectations for the kind of information that should be
disclosed.260 Depending upon where mediation occurs-in a court,
community dispute center, administrative agency, or private law of-
fice-relevant legal and social norms should suggest the appropriate
disclosures.
a. Court Mediation
Special caution should be exercised when mediation occurs in
court, an area that represents perhaps the largest growth in the insti-
tutionalization of mediation practice. Instead of ajudge to guard the
fairness of the dispute resolution process, it is the mediator who as-
sumes this responsibility. The principle of informed consent acts as a
check on the mediator's power and helps to promote fairness.
Presumably, parties who choose to resolve disputes through the
judicial system want what the courts have to offer-adjudication based
on legal norms. Their expectations for a legal dispute resolution pro-
cess are put on hold when they are diverted to mediation, whether by
individual choice or by court mandate. 261 In identifying the practices
that foster informed consent in court mediation, it is useful to focus
separately on the dimensions of disclosure in mediation. Parties need
information that educates them about the mediation process and in-
formation that helps them to achieve a fair outcome. The informa-
DARDS, supra note 118, at Rule 5. See generally Margaret Shaw et al., National Standards
for Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 31 F.Am. & CONCILIATION REV. 156 (1993).
259 Overall, we need empirical study to identify the subtle kinds of coercion that
occur in mandatory mediation programs and its effect on the voluntariness of any
outcome that results. For example, in the informal courts where docket control may
be a primary motivation for mediation, a mediator may tell parties "If you folks do not
reach an agreement today in mediation, you may have to come back to court three or
four times before a judge will be able to hear your case." What impact does this
statement have on a party's decision to settle in mediation?
260 See Bums, supra note 66 (describing several differences between judicial medi-
ation in the public courts and in private settings).
261 See Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation, supra note 16, at 63.
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tion contained in process disclosures must be clear about how
mediation differs from adjudication by a judge or arbitrator, the
norms governing the court mediation process, and how agreements
reached in mediation will be enforced. Disclosures that help parties
to achieve fair outcomes may include a general overview of the range
of legal entitlements that might be available to parties through court
adjudication.2 62
3. Representational Status
When parties are represented by lawyers in mediation, we should
be able to assume that lawyers do their job and provide their clients
with enough information for them to engage in informed decision-
making.2 63 In situations where lawyers actually negotiate for their cli-
ents in mediation, any semblance of informed consent in mediation
will depend in large measure on the attorney's adherence to the prin-
ciple of informed consent in the lawyer-client relationship.2 64 As a
262 Such disclosures would depend on the parties' representational status and on
their expectations when they initially sought to resolve their dispute in court. This is
not to encourage outcomes which approximate legal remedies, but to insure that
agreements based on nonlegal values are at least informed by the law. This may re-
quire a duty of greater disclosure to unrepresented parties. See infra Part V.B.3 (on
unrepresented parties).
263 This would include information about the kind of mediation process the par-
ties wish. The extensive literature on mediator styles and practices helps the media-
tion advocate to know what processes are available and to advise clients accordingly.
See supra note 103. Thus, legal representation enhances the participants' informed
decisionmaking. See ILL. CT. R. 11, No.14 (describing the role of an attorney repre-
senting parties in mediation).
264 Opinion is mixed about the value that lawyers bring to mediation. Lawyers'
participation in mediation has been encouraged because it can improve the fairness
of negotiations in mediation and protect parties from settlement pressures. See, e.g.,
Rogers & McEwen, Employing the Law, supra note 84; McEwen et al., supra note 57, at
1394 ("[l]awyers' participation in the mediation session ... buffers the pressures to
settle" which parties may experience); Stulberg, supra note 57, at 943-44 (arguing for
lawyers in court mediation). On the other hand, lawyers may undermine the media-
tion process by adapting negotiating strategies that are incompatible with the goals of
mediation. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YAIE LJ. 950, 986 (1979) ("Lawyers may be more likely
than lay people to adopt negotiating strategies involving threats and the strategic mis-
representation of their client's true preferences in the hope of reaching a more
favorable settlement for the client."); Lande, supra note 103, at 876 ("Although the
participation of the principals' lawyers in mediation may provide some assurances of
high-quality consent, if the lawyers are strongly motivated to reach 'some settlement in
the mediation, their presence may undermine rather than support the principals'
decisionmaking ability.... ."). As mediation becomes increasingly institutionalized in
the court system, it may have to be taken into account in litigation planning. For a
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general rule then, the mediator's informed consent responsibilities to
represented parties and their lawyers are limited to disclosure of base-
line information.2 65
The situation is quite different when parties come to mediation
without lawyers. Unrepresented parties pose the most significant chal-
lenge to implementing the principle of informed consent in media-
tion practice. Where mediation takes place in a mandatory setting, or
where only one of the parties in the mediation is represented by coun-
sel, the situation is even more serious.266 Regulatory structures vary in
their approach to unrepresented parties in mediation: some statutes
specifically prohibit mediators from giving professional opinions un-
less attorneys are present;267 others require that mediators advise un-
represented parties to consult with attorneys before signing any
agreements. 268 The latter approach is not particularly helpful given
the pervasive problem of inability to afford legal counsel.269 The
discussion of the value that lawyers add to litigation bargaining, see Russell Korobkin
& Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Law-
yer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 137 (1997) ("Our experimental results support the hypothesis
that lawyers, on average, evaluate litigation options differently than litigants, with law-
yers' evaluations more likely to be consistent with the expected value analysis pre-
sumed by economic models of litigation. Because the monetary cost of trial-relative
to settlement-is high, it follows that lawyers will favor settlement more often than
their clients.") See RonaldJ. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Cooperation and Competition
in Litigation: Can Lawyers Dampen Conflict, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 185
(Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (exploring notion that lawyers may be able to coop-
erate with each other in situations where clients cannot). For a helpful discussion
and guidelines for lawyers who advocate for clients in mediation, see Jean R. Ster-
nlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to
Structure Advocacy in a Non-Adversarial Setting (forthcoming in 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. (1999)).
265 See supra notes 240-44 and accompanying text.
266 See, e.g., Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of
Lawyers' Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REV. 79 (1997).
267 See, e.g., ALA. CODE OF ETHICS FOR MEDIATORS, Standard 7(d) (1997).
268 E.g., DEL. CT. R. Cwy. P. 16.2(I); ALA. CODE OF ETHICS FOR MEDIATORS, Standard
7(b).
269 See CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICE AND THE PUBLIC, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVILJusTICE, A FINAL REPORT ON THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (1996); COMMISSION ON
NONLAWYER PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, NONLAWYER AcrrIry IN LAW-RELATED SIT-
UATIONS: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 35 (Aug. 1995) [hereinafter NONLAWYER
AcaT-vn] (citing studies on inability of low-income and middle-income households to
obtain legal services); Deborah Chalfie, Break the Lauyers' Legal Advice Monopoly, NEWS-
DAY, Dec. 3, 1989, at 4 (noting studies that show low- and middle-income people being
"shut out of America's legal system" because they cannot afford lawyers); John
Greenya, A Crisis of Inadequate Representation: Report of the D.C. Bar Public Service Activi-
ties Corporation Landlord Tenant Task Force, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER 42, Nov.-Dec.
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problem of unrepresented parties in the mediation process, however,
is not just a "poor person's" issue. Some statutes permit mediators to
exclude lawyers from mediation sessions.2 70
Under a sliding-scale model of informed consent disclosure,
mediators owe a greater duty of disclosure to unrepresented parties
than they owe to parties who come to mediation with lawyers. 271 Fair-
ness demands that each party understand what it is doing when it en-
gages in mediation decisionmaking. As a general proposition, more
information is required for those who may lack the ability to negotiate
effectively for themselves.2 72 Overall, we must pay more attention to
the methodology of process disclosures that are typically given by the
mediator in an opening statement to the parties.273 Informed con-
1998 at 42; Susan Freinkel, Breaking Up Is Hard To Do, RECORDER, Nov. 2, 1992, at 1
(discussing the increase in number of litigants without lawyers in California courts);
The Honorable Janet Reno, Address Delivered at the Celebration of the Seventy-Fiflh Anni-
versary of Women at Fordham Law School, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 5, 8 (1994) ("eighty per-
cent of the poor and the working poor in the United States do not have access to legal
services"); Louis S. Rulli, Pennsylvania Review, 1994-Foward: Pennsylvania Legal Service
at Risk, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 541, 544 n.17 (1995) ("as much as 80% of the civil legal
needs of the poor are unmet with current resources") (citing AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
LEGAL NEEDS AND CrvILJusTE: A SURvEY OF AMERICANS (1994); AMEmCAN BAR ASS'N,
NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF TiE POOR (1989); REPORT OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASs'N TASK FORCE FOR LEGAL SERVICES TO THE NEEDY (1990)). A
1987 study of the legal needs of the poor in Massachusetts found that no more than
15% of the total legal needs of the poor were being met. See MAsS. LEGAL ASiSTANCE
CORP., MASS. LEGAL SERVICES PLAN FOR ACrION 3 (1987) [hereinafter MLAC Plan for
Action]. "Between 85% and 92% of the low income people in Louisiana who had civil
legal needs in 1991 were not represented by an attorney." William P. Quigley, The
Unmet Civil Legal Needs of the Poor in Louisiana, 19 S.U. L. REv. 273 (1992). See also NEw
YORK STATE BAR Ass'N COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID, NEW YORK LEGAL NEEDS STurn FI-
NAl REPORT (December 1993) (stating that no more than 14% of the poor's overall
need for legal assistance was being met); REPORT OF ADVISORY CoUNCIL OF MARYLAND
LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, ACTION PLAN FOR LEGAL SERVICES TO MARYLAND'S POOR
(1988). See generally Sophia M. Deseran, The Pro Bono Debate and Suggestions for a Work-
able Reform, 38 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 617, 636-37 (1990).
270 E.g., CAL. FAm. CODE § 3182 (West 1998); IDAHO CT. 1K 16(j), 8(B) (child cus-
tody and visitation disputes); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(a) (6) (West 1997); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 767.11(10) (a) (West 1997); ARiz. REv. STAT., LOCAL R. OF PRAC. SUPERIOR CT.
MARICOPA CouNmy 6.8(e) (giving the mediator the discretion to exclude counsel in
domestic relations mediation).
271 This may result in the mediator engaging in practices that could be considered
a form of evaluative mediation.
272 See Volpe & Bahn, supra note 75, at 304 (recommending that mediators give
information when parties lack ability or skills to negotiate adequately).
273 It should be noted, however, that in many community-based mediation pro-
grams, intake staff members provide process information to the parties before the
mediation session begins.
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sent, however, is not just an "event" that occurs in the opening stages
of the mediation process. Rather, it involves continual education of
parties. If information about the mediation process is given in the
mediator's opening statement, it should be repeated at regular inter-
vals to make sure that parties understand.274 We should also rethink
where, how, and by whom process information is given. Does process
disclosure have to be one event or could it be accomplished in stages?
How should it be accomplished? Certainly, some information can be
disclosed by the mediator, while courts and other public agencies
could offer disclosure through manuals,2 75 videos, 276 and outline
guides. 277
C. Unrepresented Parties in Mandatory Court Mediation: The Case for an
Informative Decisionmaking Model
Justice and fairness questions are implicated when unrepresented
parties are required to mediate in court.278 This is particularly true
for the poor and uneducated. 279 Parties who come to court expecting
274 There is a danger that parties who are nervous, or who may be in court for the
first time, do not listen to the opening statement very carefully. The National Stan-
dards for Court-Connected Mediation Programs do show sensitivity to pro se parties
in mediation, particularly to the feeling that they must settle. See Shaw et al., supra
note 258.
275 See Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 86.
276 See supra note 141 (discussing Utah's approach).
277 One unhappy court mediation consumer has suggested that courts might pro-
vide an outline or some instruction for both parties to follow. See Wendy Clark, One
Consumer's View ofADR, NIDR (Summer/Fall 1993), at 15. We must also be sensitive
to the problem of illiteracy in the United States. See WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF
FACTS 832 (1998) (citing a 4% illiteracy rate in the United States).
278 An eloquent summary of the dilemma faced by mediators is found in the Medi-
ator's Manual for New York City Housing Court:
One goal of mediation is empowerment of the parties through participation
in the process-through meaningful bargaining and self-determination. Yet
without knowledge of one's rights, how can a party truly bargain or deter-
mine the future? Pro se tenants who may face eviction from their homes
and pro se landlords who may face loss of their home, life-savings and/or
property are both entitled to participate in the mediation process from posi-
tions of knowledge of rights rather than ignorance. Remember, what's at
stake here is shelter-a basic human necessity.
Mediator's Manual for New York City Housing Court (prepared by Gail Davis, Esq.
1997) (copy on file with the author).
279 See Depner et al., supra note 143, at 310, 316 (reporting high satisfaction with
custody mediation in California and observing that "information and community re-
ferrals may be particularly helpful to clients who have less formal education and fewer
financial resources"); Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants'Ethnicity
and Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 L. & Soc'y
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to see and present their case to ajudge are not necessarily prepared to
engage in a private bargaining session with their opponents (even if it
is chaired by a neutral and knowledgeable mediator) and there is
something unsettling about requiring them to do so without knowing
the range of their legal options and entitlements.280
In an ideal world, a court could assign lawyers to provide legal
information to unrepresented parties or to assure that they under-
stand the information that may have been provided by courts in the
form of brochures, manuals, and videos, etc. As a practical matter,
however, it is usually the mediator who is available to inform and
guide unrepresented parties. Where unrepresented parties are igno-
rant of their legal rights, an informative decisionmaking model281
should be offered to them. The mediator acts as a conduit of legal
information to promote the parties' understanding.28 2 The informa-
tive model does not include telling parties what outcome should be
followed.283 Parties decide for themselves what value they place on
the legal information that has been provided to them and they decide
for themselves what outcome should be reached.
How do we know whether an unrepresented tenant would really
agree in mediation to vacate her home if she knew that she was not
REv. 767 (1996) (empirical study of small claims actions in New Mexico found that
minority plaintiffs and white, non-Hispanics made agreements in mediation which on
the average represented less money than the court awarded similar plaintiffs). The
authors propose that mediators might clarify two forms of mediation, one that repli-
cates the court model and one that is facilitative, and determine which of them is
appropriate in a particular dispute. See id. at 793.
280 For a disturbing account of what happens to unrepresented tenants in one
housing court's mediation program, see Erica L. Fox, Alone in the Hallway: Challenges to
Effective Self-Representation in Negotiation, 1 HARv. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 85, 91-92
(1996).
When tenants arrived at court, an official directed most of them upstairs to
mediation .... Tenants received little guidance through the process. The
court officials gave no explanation of mediation, nor did they mention its
voluntary nature. Mediation was never distinguished from negotiation, the
process in which most tenants participated. No information was available
regarding the rights and responsibilities of the landlords or tenants. Simi-
larly, no one was available to answer questions.
Id. at 92-93.
281 I assume here that the mediator is competent to offer such a model.
282 In this regard, the mediator should explain the meaning and purpose of the
informative model-that legal information is provided so that parties can make rea-
sonably educated decisions. At the same time, parties should understand the limita-
tions of this kind of legal information. See Stark, supra note 80, at 797. Finally, parties
should be able to freely reject this type of mediator-party relationship.
283 In this respect, the informative model is similar to the approach adopted by
the A.BA STANDARDS OF PRArTICE, supra note 97, at Standard IV.
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required to do so? 28 4 How do we know whether parties would agree to
nominal damages if they knew that a statute provided treble damages?
How do we know whether a debtor would agree to pay a debt in medi-
ation if she knew the statute of limitations on the debt had already
expired? The point is that we do not know the answers to these ques-
tions and that is why, in the interests ofjustice and fairness, we should
err on the side of greater information about the law. An informative
decisionmaking model can provide such disclosure.
I argue that unrepresented parties are entitled to receive infor-
mation about their legal entitlements when a court requires them to
participate in mediation. 28 5 This does not mean that they should
know with certainty how a court would rule.28 6 Rather, they should
have an understanding of the range of possible outcomes and laws
that may affect those outcomes. In small claims court, for example, an
unrepresented claimant in mediation should understand that in court
she might receive the amount for which she sued or she might receive
nothing at all. If a statute of limitations or treble damage award stat-
ute were relevant to a claimant's case, that claimant should be aware
of their existence and their possible impact on recovery. At the same
time, however, the claimant should understand that an agreement
reached in mediation might be more beneficial to her than a court
ruling based on law.28 7
I do not advocate that court mediation sessions replicate the ad-
versarial model or that mediation outcomes approximate what is avail-
able in court. I do argue, however, that when courts require
unrepresented parties to mediate, that their mediation outcomes be
informed by law. This is not to suggest that, once informed of their
legal entitlements, parties will automatically seek legal remedies in the
mediation process. Other nonlegal values may matter more. But if
the principle of informed consent means anything in court media-
tion, it means that parties should be able to decide for themselves
284 See, e.g., Wright v. Brockett, 571 N.Y.S.2d 660 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
285 Several scholars support giving some kind of legal information to parties. See,
e.g., Maute, supra note 57; Stark, supra note 80, at 795; Waldman, supra note 103, at
152 (" [M] ediators better serve their clients if they can offer sufficient legal informa-
tion to permit continued negotiation, thus limiting the role of independent counsel
to that of a fine-tuning specialist."); Weckstein, supra note 103, at 530. For a descrip-
tion of several landlord-tenant mediation programs that provide legal information to
parties, see Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 86 at 116 (arguing that mediation pro-
grams should consider it part of their professional responsibility to inform uniformed
parties of their rights).
286 This would not even be possible with attorney representation.
287 This equally important understanding requires that parties also have an appre-
ciation of their nonlegal interests.
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what values do matter. They should know what legal entitlements they
are waiving in the name of autonomy and self-determination. By un-
derstanding both their legal and nonlegal interests, they can make
tradeoffs among these interests that are at least reasonably educated.
D. Addressing Some Concerns with the Informative Decisionmaking Model
1. Neutrality
Permitting mediators to give legal information to unrepresented
parties poses a threat to neutrality, a primary value of mediation. 288
Whether such a practice should be permitted, therefore, is a highly
debated question. Some commentators have called for an activist ap-
proach in providing legal information to parties, 289 while others be-
lieve that absolute neutrality is required.290 In my view, we should not
approach this issue as a question of absolutes. As Sara Cobb and Janet
Rifin have observed, there are degrees of neutrality in mediation. 291
Perhaps the real question should be: when is absolute neutrality called
for and when is a modified approach preferable? I argue that when
court programs require unrepresented parties to enter the mediation
process, fairness demands that these parties know their legal options
before making final decisions in mediation. A modified approach to
mediator neutrality permits mediators to employ an informative deci-
sionmaking model and give unrepresented parties such information.
2. Mediator Ignorance of Legal Information
Depending upon the court program in which mediation takes
place, a wide range of legal knowledge may be required and
mediators, whether or not they are lawyers, will not always know the
relevant legal information that should be disclosed to parties.292 This
is a complex problem that raises questions about who should be per-
mitted to mediate in court mediation programs. Overall, we need to
give serious attention to how we train mediators who assist unrepre-
288 The intervention of an unbiased neutral is one of the defining characteristics
of mediation.
289 See, e.g. Maute, supra note 101; Schuwerk, supra note 18; Stark, supra note 80,
at 796; see also supra note 105 and sources cited therein.
290 See, e.g., Barbara Filner & Michael Jenkins, Performance-Based Evaluation of
Mediators: The San Diego Mediation Center's Experience, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 647, 649 (1996).
291 See SARA COBB & JANET RIFEIN, PRACTIGE AND PARADox: DECONSTRUcTING NEU-
TRALriY IN MEDIATION, LAW AND SocIAL INQUIRY 5 (1991).
292 This is particularly true in Small Claims Court where a wide variety of legal
issues come into play. See; e.g., Thomas A. Dickerson, Applying Consumer Protection
Laws in Small Claims, N.Y.LJ., Sept. 21, 1998, at 1.
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sented parties in court mediation programs. 293 Integration of the
principle of informed consent in mediation practice does not mean
that parties will have perfect information. 294 At the very least, how-
ever, mediators can inform parties that their legal rights may be af-
fected and that they should consult with a lawyer if they are able
before making final decisions about continuing participation in medi-
ation or making final decisions in mediation. This suggestion may
seem disingenuous given the pervasive inability to afford lawyers. 295 It
does alert parties, however, to proceed with caution, and it should
promote greater understanding of outcomes achieved in mediation.
3. Unauthorized Practice of Law Restrictions
Mediation practice by lawyers has sparked considerable debate
about whether mediation is the practice of law and how this question
implicates ethical rules governing lawyer behavior.296 There is much
293 See generally SOcIEmy OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, QUALIFYING DiS-
PUTE RESOLUTION PRACTITIONER'S: GUIDELINES FOR COURT-CONNECTED PROGRAMS
(State Justice Institute 1998).
294 Such a perfection standard is not even required in the physician-patient or
lawyer-client relationship. See supra Part II. Rather, the informative model attempts
to provide unrepresented parties with sufficient legal information to promote reason-
ably educated choices.
295 The difficulty that low income and moderate income parties will have in acces-
sing lawyers is well-documented. See supra note 269. Fortunately, there are some in-
novative mediation programs that provide assistance to pro se parties. See New York
City Housing Court Mediation Manual (1997) (on file with the author). Another ex-
ample of what could be done is the MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME COURT UNIFORM RULE
ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 6(I) which provides in part:
The court shall give particular attention to the issues presented by unrepre-
sented parties, such as the need for the neutral to memorialize the agree-
ment and the danger of coerced settlement in cases involving an imbalance
of power between the parties. In dispute intervention, in cases in which one
or more of the parties is not represented by counsel, a neutral has a respon-
sibility, while maintaining impartiality, to raise questions for the parties to
consider as to whether they have the information needed to reach a fair and
fully informed settlement of the case.
See also Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 86 (describing landlord-tenant mediation
programs that provide legal information to unrepresented parties).
296 See, e.g., Symposium, Is Mediation the Practice of Law, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM 1 (1996); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lauyers'Responsibil-
ities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: LawyeringAs Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 631 (1997). For a view of the practicing bar on this issue, see MICHIGAN
BAR STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, Op. RI-278 (1966)
(document drafting by an attorney-mediator is a legal service) and NEW YORK BAR
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less debate on the question of whether nonlawyer mediators who give
legal information to unrepresented parties may be in violation of un-
authorized practice of law restrictions.297 Several bar association eth-
ics opinions on divorce mediation have held that nonlawyer mediators
who provide various forms of legal assistance in mediation would be
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.2 98 In my view, we need
to reconsider the value of this doctrine as increasing numbers of par-
ties appear in court, unable to afford legal representation, 299 and are
required to mediate before they may have a trial. At a minimum,
rules governing disclosure of legal information in mediation should
be broad enough to permit mediators to identify legal issues that may
arise. 00 We should also consider permitting nonlawyer mediators to
give legal information in carefully circumscribed situations.8 0'
ASSOCIATION COMM1eE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Formal Op. 678 (1996) (offering
advice in mediation by lawyer-mediators may be the practice of law).
297 See Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really
Make Good Neighbors-OrEven Good Sense2, 1980 AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 159; Deborah L.
Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unau-
thorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1981).
298 See ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 81, at § 10:05; see also Werle v. Rhode Island
Bar Ass'n, 755 F.2d 195 (1st Cir. 1985).
299 See supra note 269.
300 This assumes that the mediator is aware that a legal issue may be involved. For
an excellent example of sensitivity to the plight of pro se parties, see Mediator's Man-
ual for NewYork City Housing Court (1997) (on file with the author) ("As mediators,
we are prohibited from rendering legal advice to the parties; however, we must be
aware of and able to identify legal issues which may arise which would render the
process itself or any agreement entered into unfair and inappropriate.").
301 Several commentators support relaxation of rules prohibiting unauthorized
practice. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Ap-
praoches to Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CANGE 701 (1996); Russell G.
Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Wy Discarding Professional Ideology Will Im-
prove the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229 (1995); Deborah L.
Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHICS, 209 (1990);
Prohibitions on Nonlayer Practice: An Overview and Preliminary Assessment, in REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE Cry OF NEW YORK 190-209 (March 1995) (giving "preliminary endorsement to a
deregulated licensing approach that permits greater nonlawyer practice in specified
areas but establishes minimal requirements in order to protect the public while simul-
taneously increasing the availability of low-cost, accessible legal services to all"). Attor-
ney General Janet Reno has called for greater access to justice and has suggested a
proposal for licensed community advocates who would be trained to assist parties in
dealing with common legal problems. See The Honorable Janet Reno, Address at the
1999 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in New Orleans,
Louisiana (Jan. 9, 1999). Extensive analysis of the unauthorized practice doctrine in
relation to mediation practice is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. NONLAVwYER
Acrrvr, supra note 269.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Informed consent has a central role to play in mediation. With-
out it, mediation's promises of autonomy and self-determination are
empty. This Article has given the theoretical and policy justifications
for a reform of mediation practice that honors the principle of in-
formed consent.30 2 I have argued for a contextualized approach that
takes into account mediation's location, the voluntariness of the par-
ties' consent, and their representational status. This kind of analysis
will lead to a more informed practice of mediation decisionmaking
than exists currently and provide a perspective that can more pru-
dently guide a mediator's conduct. The proposed approach promotes
greater fairness in mediation, particularly for parties who do not have
lawyers. And fairness is what matters at the end of the day.
302 While there is not yet a uniform statute to govern mediation practice, a joint
working group of the Uniform Law Commission and American Bar Association,
under the direction of Professor Nancy Rogers, is currently engaged in efforts to draft
such a statute. I urge the commission to include in the uniform statute a robust con-
cept of informed consent that is sensitive to the plight of unrepresented parties in
mandatory mediation programs.
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